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The Naked Clone
BY JOHN CHARLES KUNICH°
"Whew! What they can't do these days!"
Jiminy Cricket'
I. INTRODUCTION
A s modem science rips gaping holes in the realm of the impossible,
Z-]modern law struggles to keep pace. Particularly when revolution-
&-y advancements in science demolish ancient notions of the proper ambit
of human action, the legal system has been unprepared to meet the new
challenges proactively. Instead of accommodating the new realities, there
are powerful people--chiefly political and religious leaders-who have
* Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law,
Bristol, Rhode Island. B.S. 1975, M.S. 1979, University of Illinois at Chicago; J.D.
1985, Harvard Law School; LL.M. 1993, George Washington University School
of Law. The author thanks his wife, Marcia Vigil, and their daughters, Christina
Laurel Kunich and Julie-Kate Marva Kunich, for their love and support.
I In the animated film PmnoccIlo (Disney 1940), Jiminy Cricket uttered these
words of astonishment when he witnessed the Blue Fairy bringing a wooden
puppet, Pinocchio, to life. Despite persistent rumors, there is no credible evidence
that Pinocchio himself was a clone of his maker, Geppetto.
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tried to bend the law into a reactive, even reactionary, force in the path of
full exploration of the inchoate terrain of the freshly possible.
Some of the fuel igniting the legal opposition to scientific forays into
the frontiers of imagination is a strong primeval sense that people should
not be allowed to "play God." This belief has been both explicitly and
implicitly at the core of much of the resistance to genetic engineering of
crop plants and domesticated animals.2 Fundamentally, the idea is that our
ability to perform certain tasks should not be coterminous with the legality
of doing so, at least with regard to modifying living things. There is a
belief, usually implicitly but often explicitly religious in origin, that places
some life-related areas of medical and scientific endeavor in the category
of taboo, top-sacred, forbidden mystical practices reserved exclusively unto
the Deity.
There is a related concept as well. Reflecting the premise embodied and
graphically portrayed in numerous popular horror and science fiction
novels, motion pictures, and television programs, some people are afraid
that human attempts to "play God"3 or "fool Mother Nature" are fraught
with overwhelming peril. The powerful message and visceral impact from
these fantasies is clear: When we meddle in the secrets of life, we risk
unleashing a Frankenstein's monster and visiting a horrific plague upon
ourselves and our world.4
Legal and popular opposition to genetic engineering, formidable
enough in its own right, has been dwarfed by the reaction to the prospect
of cloning human beings. During the brief aftermath of the dawn of the
See John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the
Environmental Law of Genetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 807, 813-17
(2001) (describing vocal, even violent, public opposition to transgenic technology
despite the paucity of scientific evidence against it).
3 The specter of irresponsible scientists "playing God" was highlighted by the
remarks of physicist Richard Seed when he announced his intention to open a clinic
to clone humans. He stated, "In the first two chapters of the Old Testament, we
learned that God made man in his own image. He intended the union of man and
God. Is this union spiritual or in body? I think it is talking about the body That we
would become God in body and spirit." Mr. Seed indicated that cloning is the first
step toward "indefinite life extension," in which man becomes one with God, with
almost as much power as God. Despite the implausibility of a physicist undertaking
to win the race to the first cloned human, Mr. Seed's remarks were quite successful
in attracting the spotlight of public attention. Richard Seed, quoted in Gene
Weingarten, Strange Egg: A House Call to the Mysterious Doctor Seed, the Man
Who Wants to Clone Humans, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1998, at F1.
4 Kunich, supra note 2, at 813-17.
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cloning age, governments around the world have hastily acted to place
severe restrictions, including outright bans, on the cloning of human beings
and/or experimentation along such lines. The United States has not been an
exception. The degree of unanimity in opposition to cloning has been
astounding, often uniting liberal and conservative, pro-life and pro-choice,
and secular and religious people of various persuasions.
Yet science continues to advance. In November, 2001, scientists in
Massachusetts announced that they succeeded in creating the world's first
cloned human embryos, albeit for only a few hours and only at the stage of
four to six cells.5 Although this privately funded research was not aimed at
the actual birth of a cloned human baby, it set off a new tidal wave of
impassioned calls for a comprehensive permanent federal ban on the
cloning of humans.6 Passion has its place, but not to the exclusion of logic,
reality, and the rule of law. Hence, the creation of this Article.
This Article will trace the history of modem cloning and the various
legal responses, both domestic and worldwide, to recent scientific
breakthroughs.7 It will then explore the constitutionality and the wisdom of
the legal measures taken within the United States.' Finally, there will be a
proposal for a more appropriate, rational, and constitutionally sound course
of action.9
I. THE FACTS OF CLONING
Popular misconceptions abound concerning cloning." Among the most
common fallacious notions are that cloning produces exact copies of an
5Rick Weiss, First Human Embryos Are Cloned in US.; Private Lab Seeks to
Mine Stem Cells for Research, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2001, at Al [hereinafter
Weiss, First Human Embryos]. Researchers at Advanced Cell Technology in
Worcester, Massachusetts, performed the research as a step in the process of
generating embryonic stem cells that could be used to create various human tissues
for therapeutic purposes. Id.
6 Id. See also Rick Weiss, Mass. Firm's Disclosure Renews Cloning Debate;
Bush Reiterates Support for Ban on Use ofEmbryos, WASH. POST, Nov. 27,2001,
at A3 [hereinafter Weiss, Mass. Firm's Disclosure] (discussing reaction to the
announcement from President George W. Bush, other political leaders worldwide,
the Vatican, and other religious organizations).
7See infra notes 10-78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 122-218 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
" See Katheryn D. Katz, The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty and Asexual
Reproduction, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 1, 15-23 (1997) (setting forth and
debunking several popular misconceptions regarding both the meaning and the
application of cloning of humans).
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original organism; children of cloning are in some sense less genuine or
less worthy than their parents; and cloning is capable of mass-producing
legions of super-powered transgenics or super-evil menaces, such as an
army of Hitlers. These fallacies should be dispatched as swiftly and
painlessly as possible.
The term "cloning" itself was once reserved for horticultural practices
involving plants, not animals. Plants can be reproduced asexually through
cuttings, for example. Today, there are several modem forms of cloning
that usually consist of direct manipulation of genetic material in a process
called somatic cell nuclear transfer ("SCNT"')," or dividing an embryonic
cell (embryo splitting), although there are other methods of cloning as
well.1
2
Embryo splitting, or blastomere separation, has not received as much
media attention as SCNT, but it is important to note its existence because
it implicates some of the same issues. Simply put, the process entails the
manipulation of a very recently fertilized ovum, the union of egg and
sperm. Within about one and a half days after fertilization, the fertilized
ovum begins to divide, forming a blastomere as cell division produces two,
four, eight, and then sixteen cells, becoming a blastocyst by about the four
day point.'3 Each of these very early embryonic cells is totipotent, i.e.,
capable of developing into an entire adult organism if separated from the
other cells. To clone via embryo splitting, the blastomere is fragmented
(into two, four, eight, or sixteen identical cells) and each cell is then
cultured to grow into a very small multi-cell embryo which must then be
implanted into an adult female of the same species. 4 Each embryo is
implanted into a separate adult female for gestation. Each surrogate mother
then carries one of these embryos to term in the usual manner and each
resultant individual would be genetically identical to the others produced
from the same split blastomere.15 That is, each individual would be
I SCNT is the method employed by the Advanced Cell Technology team to
generate the first cloned human embryos in late 2001. See Weiss, First Human
Embryos, supra note 5.
12 Anne Lawton, The Frankenstein Controversy: The Constitutionality of a
Federal Ban on Cloning, 87 KY. L.J. 277, 284-89 (1999) (outlining the various
types of cloning, i.e., molecular or gene cloning, cellular cloning, blastomere
separation or embryo splitting, and somatic cell nuclear transplantation cloning).
Of these techniques, only embryo splitting and SCNT have a potential application
to the cloning of humans. Id.
11 Id. at 287.
141d
"
'3 Id. Embryo splitting has been employed successfully to produce normal adult
sheep and cows. Additionally, researchers have cloned human embryos, mostly at
the two-cell blastomere stage, but none of the resulting embryos were permitted to
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genetically identical to the others split from the same early-stage embryo,
but not identical to any existing post-birth individual.
The process of SCNT generally involves isolating deoxyribonucleic
acid ("DNA") 6 from the nucleus of a somatic cell (i.e., non-gamete cell,
not an ovum or spermatozoa) of a donor. These somatic cells may first be
deprived of nutrients for a period sufficient to halt further cellular
development and bring them back to a totipotent state in which they are
capable of developing into any type of cell. Then the nucleus is extracted
from the donor cell and transplanted into an ooctye (egg cell) that has had
its nucleus removed (enucleated). The resulting re-nucleated cell is then
treated (as with a minuscule electrical pulse) in an attempt to fuse the
nucleus with the remainder of the cell and activate it. If activation is
successful, the cell will begin to divide, essentially in the same manner as
with an ovum fertilized by a sperm cell. If the cell develops to the
blastocyst (live embryo) stage, it is implanted in the uterus of a living
female (a surrogate gestational mother) of the same species as the donor
and recipient cells, with the goal of enabling the female to carry the embryo
and eventual fetus until birth, similar to the methods widely used for in
vitro fertilization. 7
In current practice, this SCNT is not performed only once, but instead
many times over, in an effort to overcome low success rates at the stages
of blastocyst development, implantation in the female's uterus, and
progress to birth. For example, in the famous case of the cloned sheep
named Dolly, 277 enucleated eggs were obtained and received nuclei from
adult mammary gland cells, and twenty-nine of these cells made it to the
blastocyst stage (an eleven percent success rate); of those twenty-nine
blastocysts that were then transferred to the uterus of thirteen female sheep
(ewes), only one cloned sheep was eventually born.'" This reflected a three
percent success rate among the blastocysts, and a 0.36 rate overall from
start to finish. ' However, another legitimate way of interpreting the same
results is that one out of thirteen ewes that received implanted cloned
blastocysts eventually gave birth, a 7.7 percent success rate that compares
develop for longer than six days. Id. at 288. See also Kathy A. Fackelmann,
Researchers 'Clone 'Human Embryos, 144 SCI. NEWS 276 (1993); GINA KOLATA,
CLONE: THE ROAD TO DOLLY, AND THE PATH AHEAD 175-78 (1998).
16 See Lawton, supra note 12, at 281-83 (providing a concise summary of the
basics of the role of DNA in reproduction).
17 See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS 13-38
(June 1997) [hereinafter NBAC REPORT].
11 Id. at 22.
19 Id.
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favorably with those achieved using in vitro fertilization during the first
several years of its history.2"
An individual born through SCNT intervention is not, strictly speaking,
genetically identical to the donor of the DNA. Although the nucleic DNA
is the same as in the donor, the DNA in the mitochondria (the organelles
within each cell that produce energy for cellular functions), or mDNA, is
the same as the mDNA of the recipient enucleated oocyte.2 Thus, in
SCNT, the new individual is not an exact copy, even genetically, of either
the donor or the recipient; his or her nuclear DNA comes from the DNA
donor, while the mDNA comes from the egg donor. In contrast, embryo
splitting does produce an exact genotypic duplicate-both nuclear and
mDNA-of the original fertilized ovum (the good old-fashioned union of
egg and sperm), but not a duplicate of any pre-existing individual.
This is an important point, and it is worthwhile to emphasize certain
key differences between the two major methods of cloning. Embryo
splitting is technologically much easier, at present, because there is no need
to perform delicate microscopic surgery on a cell, nor to "re-set" a fully
differentiated somatic cell and render it totipotent so that it can develop
into an entire organism. Also, as mentioned, because embryo splitting
begins with a fertilized egg, it clones a new combination of DNA from a
male and a female, not any preexisting individual. In no respect does
embryo splitting genetically replicate any one individual, any more than
does the natural process of fertilization that unites DNA from mother and
father to form an offspring. Embryo splitting is essentially a process of
artificially twinning (and beyond) an early stage embryo. In contrast, SCNT
transfers the nuclear DNA from a somatic cell of a single post-birth
individual, even an adult, and, with the exception of differences in
mitochondrial DNA, reproduces the DNA of that one individual precisely.
There is nothing in either the SCNT process or embryo splitting that
lends itself to mass production of clones. The re-nucleated oocytes or
separated cells must each be introduced into the uterus of a living female
of the same species (e.g., a female sheep in Dolly's case), one by one, each
adult female receiving one oocyte or separated cell. Although the
blastomere separation (in embryo splitting) and extraction of nucleic DNA
from donor somatic cells and the enucleation of recipient oocytes (in
20 See LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND IN A BRAVE
NEW WORLD 103-04 (1997).
21 See Shirley Tilghman, Address to the National Bioethics Advisory Commis-
sion (Mar. 13, 1997), transcript at http://www.bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/
meetings.html#1997.
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SCNT) are done in the laboratory, any resulting embryos must be carried
to term by live females, one at a time. The horror-story image of hordes of
Hitlers being churned out, factory style, is utterly without basis in scientific
fact.
There are, however, some noteworthy questions regarding the risks of
human cloning--questions that remain without completely satisfactory
answers chiefly because of the scientific community's limited experience
with cloning. For instance, early experiments in cloning frogs sometimes
produced badly deformed clones.22 Subsequent attempts to clone cows
resulted in some abnormally large calves, as much as double the usual birth
weight, and some cloned calves were born with diseases and deformed
hearts; eighteen to twenty percent of these died soon after birth.23 However,
more recent experiments involving cloned cows have resulted in "vigorous,
healthy, and normal" calves, as healthy as conventional cows, with a
pregnancy survival rate akin to those achieved by conventional livestock
breeders.24 But post-Dolly efforts, to create cloned, transgenic sheep met
with a very low success rate and, among the few lambs that survived to live
outside their surrogate mothers, some weighed almost twice the normal
amount." The reasons underlying these mixed results remain unclear. One
hypothesis is that the process of reactivating the donor DNA in the SCNT
process sometimes damages it, possibly by activating normally-dormant
22 Francis C. Pizzulli, Note, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering:
A ConstitutionalAssessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 476,
484-85 (1974). Frogs long have been subjects for cloning and other embryological
experiments because they produce thousands of relatively large, easily manipulated
eggs at a time. As long ago as 1952, researchers removed the nuclei from a frog
ovum and replaced it with the nucleus from an older embryonic cell, producing
twenty-seven tadpoles from 197 re-nucleated eggs. Some success was also
achieved using the intestines of tadpoles for the donor nuclei, but not with the
differentiated cells of adult frogs. See Lawton, supra note 12, at 289-92.
23Horizon: Dawn of the Clone Age (BBC television broadcast, Sept. 10, 1997),
transcript available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/horizon/cloneagetran.shtml.
24 Robert Lanza, quoted in John Whitfield, Cloned Cows in the Pink: Healthy
Cows Buck the Trend for Sickly Clones, NATURE SCI. UPDATE, Nov. 23, 2001, at
http://www.nature.com/nsu/011129/011129-1.html. Recent researchers have
claimed an eighty percent success rate among those cloned cows that survived
gestation, although many embryos were spontaneously aborted during gestation.
These surviving cows were reported to be as healthy and normal as any others. Id.
See also Kimiko Inoue et al., Faithful Expression of Imprinted Genes in Cloned
Mice, 295 SCIENCE 297 (2002).
25 See Nick Thorpe, Scientists Baffled by Oversized Sheep Clones, SCOTSMAN,
July 28, 1997, at 1.
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genes that harbor deleterious mutations or undesirable phenotypic potential,
or by failing properly to reactivate all necessary genes or to erase previous
patterns of gene activity in the enucleated egg.26
There are other questions awaiting answers that only time will deliver.
One intriguing issue is whether a cloned organism will somehow "inherit"
the age of its DNA donor." Was Dolly, in effect, born fully grown, with a
remaining life expectancy (derived from the adult mammary gland cell that
contributed her DNA) far less than that of an ordinary newborn lamb? Or
does the act of rendering the donor cells totipotent restore them to the
effective age of any gamete, with a full life span in store for any eventual
cloned individual? Further research and time are necessary to resolve such
questions, but these important inquiries may be cut short by legal interven-
tion.
Dolly the sheep was born on July 5, 1996, having been produced by a
research team headed by Scottish embryologist Ian Wilmut at the Roslin
Institute in Edinburgh." Dolly was front-page news because this was the
first time fully differentiated adult somatic cells had been used successfully
to clone a mammal-although previously mammals had been cloned using
early embryonic cells--thereby proving that cellular differentiation can be
reversed.29 Obviously, a key feature was the freedom from reliance on very
early, undifferentiated embryonic cells-any normal somatic cells from a
fully grown adult were now potentially the source of a clone. In the
aftermath of the February 23, 1997 announcement 3 of this stunning
advancement, there came much controversy. Presidents and the Pope,
politicians and philosophers, pundits and people on the street all felt
26 See Tilghman, supra note 21; Sharon Begley, Little Lamb, Who Made Thee?,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10, 1997, at 52, 59; Helen Pearson, Cause of Sick Clones
Contested, NATURE SC. UPDATE, Jan. 11, 2002, at http://www.nature.com/nsu/
020107/020107- 1O.html.27 See Terence Monmaney, Prospect ofHuman Cloning Gives Birth to Volatile
Issues, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1997, at Al.
28 See Rick Weiss, Scottish Scientists Clone Adult Sheep; Technique's Use with
Human is Feared, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Weiss, Scottish
Scientists Clone Adult Sheep]; Ian Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived From
Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385 NATURE 810, 813 (Feb. 27, 1997).
29 See Lawton, supra note 12, at 296. For many years, prevailing scientific
thought held that the process by which cells--capable of developing into anything
in the early embryonic stage-gradually differentiate into specific types of cells,
was irreversible. Thus, a mature muscle cell was believed incapable of ever
producing anything other than other muscle cells, whereas any blastomere cell
could be made to develop into fully formed adults. Id.
31 See Weiss, Scottish Scientists Clone Adult Sheep, supra note 28.
[VOL. 91
THE NAKED CLONE
compelled to speak out on the latest, greatest issue of the modem age. Most
famously, physicist Richard Seed declared his intention on December 5,
1997 to commence the cloning of human beings;
3' others followed suit.3 2
At that point, the proverbial organic waste matter hit the oscillating air
circulation device, and legal reactions began in earnest.
III. MAJOR LEGAL REACTIONS TO HUMAN CLONING
On several fronts, the legal response to Dolly and her would-be
successors was of a type that one would expect if the lid to Pandora's box
begun to bulge ominously. The day after the Dolly announcement, then-
President Clinton directed the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
("NBAC") to examine the legal and ethical aspects of cloning and to
prepare recommendations to guard against the misuse of cloning technol-
ogy, all within ninety days!33 Clinton, as an interim measure, also issued a
directive to all executive departments and agencies blocking the use of
federal funds to clone human beings.34
The NBAC Report recommended adoption of federal legislation to ban
the use of SCNT cloning to create children, but it did not advocate that
such a ban be made permanent.35 The NBAC Report recognized that
31 See Richard Saltus, Would-be Cloner Plans to Start With Himself; Says Wife
Will Carry Test-tube Embryo, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 1998, at A6.
32 Dr. Severino Antinori of Italy is among the embryologists who have
announced their intention to clone humans. See Steve Farrar, Maverick Fertility
Expert Plans First Human Clone, SUN. TIMES (London), Oct. 25, 1998, at 1.
Unlike physicist Richard Seed, who apparently lacked the requisite knowledge and
means to carry out his ambitious and headline-grabbing plan, Dr. Antinori is
recognized as a pioneer fertility specialist who has enabled a sixty-two-year-old
woman to become pregnant. Dr. Antinori, together with a professor of reproductive
physiology, Panos Zanos, has vowed to pursue human cloning in an unnamed
Mediterranean nation. See Nancy Gibbs, Baby, It's You! And You, And You... ;
Renegade Scientists Say They Are Ready to Start Applying the Technology of
Cloning to Human Beings. Can They Really Do it, and How Scary Would That
Be?, TIME, Feb. 19, 2001, at 46; Rick Weiss, US. Fertility Expert Announces
Efforts to Clone a Human; Consortium Led by Renegade Doctor Says It Will Help
Infertile Couples, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2001, at A3.
33 NBAC REPORT, supra note 17, at 3.
3 William J. Clinton, Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal Funding for
Cloning of Human Beings, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 281 (Mar. 4, 1997).
35 NBAC REPORT, supra note 17, at 109. The Commission believed that a
limited ban was justified because of serious questions regarding the cloning of
humans, but that any such ban should have an expiration date so as not to constitute
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
inasmuch as SCNT cloning "could represent a means of human reproduc-
tion for some people, limitations on that choice must be made only when
the societal benefits of prohibition clearly outweigh the value of maintain-
ing the private nature of such highly personal decisions."36 Furthermore, "in
light of some arguably compelling cases for attempting to clone a human
being" via SCNT, "the ethics of policy making must strike a balance
between the values society wishes to reflect and issues of privacy and the
freedom of individual choice.""
Clinton took action on the NBAC Report's recommendations by
sending Congress a draft piece of legislation entitled the Cloning Prohibi-
tion Act of 1997 ("CPA").38 The CPA would have banned the use of
nuclear transplantation technology to create a human being, whether by the
private or the public sectors, through the exercise of Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce. 9 The Act would have also made it "unlawful
for any person or other legal entity, public or private, to perform or use
somatic cell nuclear transfer [SCNT] with the intent of introducing the
product of that transfer into a woman's womb or in any other way creating
a human being."4 ° The CPA defined SCNT as "the transfer of a cell nucleus
from a somatic cell into an egg from which the nucleus has been
removed,"'" thereby not including embryo splitting among the forms of
prohibited cloning activity, and not precluding the creation of clones from
,human embryonic cells. By its terms, the CPA would have expired five
years after enactment.42
Congress never enacted the CPA, nor did it enact any of the other anti-
cloning bills put forth by various legislators. 43 These bills took many forms,
but generally speaking, they can be grouped into two main types. Some of
the bills reflected the view that research involving human embryos is
fundamentally wrong and that embryos, as a form of human life, deserve
protection from tampering. These bilis would have banned any form of
human cloning, whether it involved research alone or attempts to create an
an unnecessary infringement on citizens' right to procreate. Id.
361Id. at 107.
37 Id.
38 Cloning Prohibition Act of 1997, H.R. Doc. No. 105-97 (1997).
39 Id. § 2(c).
40 Id. § 5.
41 Id. § 4(c).
421d. § 8.
43 See generally Jennifer Cannon & Michelle Haas, The Human Cloning Pro-
hibition Act: Did Congress Go Too Far?, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 637 (1998).
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individual from human cloning." The other main type of proposed
legislation was concerned with the end result of cloning, rather than
research. These bills focused on banning the implantation of cloned
embryos, not the creation of those embryos. 5
More recently, Congress has taken the most sweeping and far-reaching
steps to date toward actual enactment of anti-cloning legislation. On
September 30, 2001, the House of Representatives passed the Human
Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 ("HCPA")46 by a vote of 265 to 162, with
sixty-three Democrats and two Independents joining 200 Republicans in
favor of the bill.47 By a vote of 251 to 176, the House also rejected an
amendment that would have allowed private companies to create cloned
human embryos (but not human babies) and develop therapies from their
cells.48 The Act would outlaw the creation of cloned human embryos for
any purpose, whether to make cloned babies or to produce potentially
therapeutic stem cells, and would ban the importation of any medical
treatments created abroad from closed human embryo cells.49 This action
followed the lead of President George W. Bush and his Administration; the
Administration announced on June 20, 2001 that it favored the most far-
reaching of several competing bills to criminalize the cloning of humans.5
4See, e.g., The Bond Act, S. 368, 105th Cong. § 1(a) (1997); Human Cloning
Research Prohibition Act, H.R. 922, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Human Cloning
Prohibition Act, H.R. 923, 105th Cong. (1997); Human Cloning Prohibition Act
of 1998, S. 1599, 105th Cong. (1998); and the Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S.
1601, 105th Cong. (1998). See also Lawton, supra note 12, at 304-10.
45 See, e.g., both versions of the Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act
of 1998, S. 1602, 105th Cong. (1998); S., 1611, 105th Cong. (1998). The CPA
would also fall within this category. See also Lawton, supra note 12, at 310-11.
Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (2001).
"7 See Rick Weiss & Juliet Eilperin, House Votes Broad Ban On Cloning,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2001, at Al.48Id.
49 Id.
50 See Rick Weiss, Bush Backs Broad Ban on Human Cloning; Prohibition
Would Cover Embryos for Research, WASH. POST, June 21, 2001, at Al. Among
the alternative anti-cloning bills introduced during the 107th Congress were H.R.
1608, H.R. 1644, and S.790. In furtherance of this policy direction, President Bush
named seventeen individuals to serve on a new President's Council on Bioethics
on January 16, 2002. The Council made its recommendations concerning a ban on
the cloning of humans in July 2002, advocating a total, permanent ban on
reproductive cloning and, in a deeply divided opinion, recommending allowance
for some therapeutic cloning. See Statement by White House Press Secretary,
President Names Members of Bioethics Council (Jan. 22, 2002), at http://www.
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The HCPA defines human cloning as:
[H]uman asexual reproduction, accomplished by introducing nuclear
material from one or more human somatic cells into a fertilized or
unfertilized oocyte whose nuclear material has been removed or inacti-
vated so as to produce a living organism (at any stage of development)
that is genetically virtually identical to an existing or previously existing
human organism."'
This definition appears to describe the SCNT, but not embryo splitting
techniques of cloning. However, in contrast to some of the earlier bills we
have mentioned, and contrary to the recommendations in the NBAC Report,
the HCPA is a permanent ban with no expiration date. 2
The HCPA would make it:
[U]nlawful for any person or entity, public or private, in or affecting
interstate commerce, knowingly-
(1) to perform or attempt to perform human cloning;
(2) to participate in an attempt to perform human cloning; or
(3) to ship or receive for any purpose an embryo produced by
human cloning or any product derived from such embryo.
53
It would also prohibit "any person or entity, public or private, knowingly
to import for any purpose an embryo produced by human cloning, or any
product derived from such embryo."54 Violations are punishable by
imprisonment for up to ten years, or a fine, or both."5 In addition, civil
penalties are available in the case of a violation that involves the "deriva-
tion of a pecuniary gain."56 Such civil penalties are set at a minimum fine
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020116-9.html. It was initially antici-
pated by some observers that the Council would issue advice consistent with the
well-known views of President Bush but a narrow majority of the Council split
from the President in recommending less than a complete ban on therapeutic
cloning. See Arthur Caplan, Opinion, A Council of Clones, MSNBC (Jan. 17,
2002), at http://www.msnbc.com/news/689297.asp. See Human Cloning and
Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry, at http://www.bioethics.gov/cloningreport/.
5" H.R. 2505, § 301(1).
52 Id.
53 Id. § 302(a)(l)-(3).
54 Id. § 302(b).
"Id. § 302(c)(1).
5Id. § 302(c)(2).
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of $1,000,000, with a ceiling of "not more than an amount equal to the
amount of the gross gain multiplied by two, if that amount is greater than
$1,000,000. "1'
In terms of possible restrictions on scientific research, the HCPA
provides that "[n]othing in this section restricts areas of scientific research
not specifically prohibited by this section, including research in the use of
nuclear transfer or other cloning techniques to produce molecules, DNA,
cells other than human embryos, tissues, organs, plants, or animals other
than humans."58
The Senate debated anti-cloning legislation during the early months of
2002. Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas led the efforts to pass a compre-
hensive ban identical to the House version of HCPA.59 There was also a
major competing bill, championed by Senator Diane Feinstein of Califor-
nia, that would have banned reproductive cloning while allowing some
forms of therapeutic cloning.' However, neither bill was ever voted on by
the Senate.6'
Even absent such new federal legislation, the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration ("FDA") asserted that it has the authority to regulate cloning and
claimed that FDA approval is required prior to any attempt to clone a
human being within the United States.62 The FDA based this claim on its
guidelines for biological products that contain cells substantially altered
through "more than minimal" manipulation.63 This is, at best, a tenuous link
to cloning, and the FDA may be overreaching.'
57 Id.
5sId. § 302(d).
s Weiss & Eilperin, supra note 47.
60 Senators' Bill Details Rules on Cloning Research, WASH. POST, June 6,
2002, at A3.61Drug Makers Grapple With Genetic, Cellular Therapies, Food & Drug Letter,
Issue No. 656, 2002 WL 12321193 (Aug. 2, 2002).
62 Rick Weiss, Human Clone Research Will Be Regulated; FDA Asserts It Has
StatutoryAuthority to RegulateAttempts at Human Cloning, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,
1998, at Al. See generally Christine Willgoos, FDA Regulation: An Answer to the
Questions of Human Cloning and Germline Gene Therapy, 27 AM. J.L. & MED.
101 (2001).
63 FDA, PROPOSED APPROACH TO REGULATION OF CELLULAR AND TISSUE-
BASED PRODUCTS 6-7, 10 (Feb. 28, 1997), at http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdls/
celltissue.pdf.
6" See Elizabeth C. Price, Does the FDA Have Authority to Regulate Human
Cloning?, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 619 (1998) (maintaining that the FDA lacks
jurisdiction to regulate cloning as a "drug," "medical device," or "biological
product"); Willgoos, supra note 62, at 119-22. See also Rick Weiss, Legal Barriers
to Human Cloning May Not Hold Up, WASH. POST, May 23, 2001, at Al.
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Under the Public Health Service Act, a "biological product" is defined
as, inter alia, a "virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood,
blood component or derivative ... or analogous product."65 Before the
FDA could regulate cloned human embryos under this definition, they
would have to be deemed an "analogous product," presumably one used to
treat the disease of infertility. The definition appears on its face to be
designed to address entities that are either obviously non-human or only a
bodily component, things very different from human embryos." And the
equation of human beings, or human embryos, with products is itself one
of the bases for anti-cloning arguments, as we shall see below, and thus it
would be questionable for governmental adoption of this concept to form
the foundation for federal regulation of cloning. Official government
commodification of human beings, in the process of defending people from
the supposed indignity of being commodified by cloning, is at least one
layer of irony beyond the straight-face test.
The FDA has, in essence, developed a creative and decidedly uncon-
ventional definition of a key term, "biological product," for the express
purpose of conferring regulatory jurisdiction upon itself. This was evidently
an attempt to step into the void wherein no administrative agency had clear
authority to regulate the cloning of humans. If nature abhors a vacuum,
bureaucrats abhor it more. This bold assertion of authority, where none
would normally exist, is akin to the manner in which the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") claimed the power to regulate genetically
modified organisms as either chemical substances or entities with pesticidal
properties under the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.67
Some state legislatures have already enacted cloning legislation,
and in this regard, have been ahead of the United States Congress.
California was the first,6" followed by Rhode Island,69 Michigan," and
65 Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2002).
"See Gregory J. Rokosz, Human Cloning: Is the Reach ofFDA Authority Too
Far a Stretch?, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 464, 498 (2000).67 See generally Kunich, supra note 2.
68 California enacted legislation on October 4, 1997, that placed a five-year
moratorium on cloning of humans via SCNT using adult differentiated cells as the
donors. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185 (West 2002).
69 Rhode Island placed an initial five-year moratorium on cloning of humans by
either SCNT (with cells from either embryos or adults as donors) or embryo
splitting. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-16.4-1 to 4-4 (1998). This sunset provision was
recently extended until July 7, 2010. Id. § 23-16-4.4 (2002).
70 Michigan banned human cloning outright on June 3, 1998, with no expira-
tion date. The Michigan ban prohibits SCNT using either embryonic or adult donor
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Louisiana,7 in either banning the cloning of humans or imposing a
moratorium on cloning within the state, with varying treatment of the
SCNT and embryo splitting techniques. Virginia permanently banned
reproductive human cloning in 2001,72 and Iowa has now enacted a
permanent ban on both reproductive and therapeutic cloning, as ofApril 26,
2002. 73 Many other states have since taken action to at least consider
similar legislation.74
The cloning controversy has by no means been confined to the United
States. For example, the 1997 Council of Europe Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings75 is
an international agreement that features a total prohibition on the cloning
of human beings.76 Individual nations have also taken steps to ban the
cells, but does not ban embryo splitting. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.16274
(West 2002).
"' The Louisiana law provides, inter alia, that "[n]o person shall clone or
attempt to clone a human being." The use of state funds for cloning is also banned.
Violations are punishable by ten years in prison, a fine of up to ten million dollars,
or both. The law has a sunset date of July 1, 2003. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
40:1299.36.2 - .36.6 (West 2002).72 VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.22 (2001).
73 IOWA CODE § 707B (2002) (approved by the Governor Apr. 26, 2002). Iowa
thus joins California, Rhode Island, Michigan, Louisiana, and Virginia in enacting
a ban on human cloning.
74 See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges
to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 645 n.13 (1998) (listing
numerous states then considering anti-cloning legislation).
75 Council of Europe, Draft Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, 36 I.L.M.
1415, 1417 (1997) (opened for signature Jan. 12, 1998 and entered into force Mar.
1, 2001. As of July 3, 2002, eleven nations had ratified or acceded to this
convention, including: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Greece,
Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain, and eighteen more had
signed but not yet ratified, including: Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.). See Council of Europe,
Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of a Treaty (July 3, 2002), at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/ cadreprincipal.htm (provides a table of
nations signing and ratifying).
76 See generally Nati Somekh, Note, The European Total Ban on Human
Cloning: An Analysis of the Council of Europe's Actions in Prohibiting Human
Cloning, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 397 (1999); Adam Greene, Note, The World After
Dolly: InternationalRegulation ofHuman Cloning, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
341 (2001).
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cloning of humans." And, in late February, 2002, the United States
extended its anti-cloning campaign to the United Nations, proposing a.
"global and comprehensive ban" on the cloning of humans and on "all
experimentation involving human embryos."78
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS ADVANCED FOR ANTI-CLONING LEGAL MEASURES
There is not a shortage of arguments in favor of banning or drastically
restricting efforts to clone human beings. This is one of those subjects on
which virtually everyone appears to have an opinion--often a strongly held
opinion-the arguments have taken various forms, blending together and
resisting strict compartmentalization. The anti-cloning arguments are
summarized below and attempts at categorization have been made for the
sake of facilitating analysis.
A. Religious, Moral, and Ethical Grounds
Many of the reasons marshaled in opposition to cloning of humans, or
to experimentation on and killing of human embryos, are directly rooted in
religious, ethical, or moral beliefs that this is just something people should
not do. Whether couched in terms to the effect that such cloning is
tantamount to "trying to play God" and should be reserved for God alone,79
or phrased in less overtly religious language,"° this type of argument
represents deep personal convictions. The people who hold these beliefs are
7 See, e.g., Mark Henderson et al., Emergency Laws to Ban Human Cloning,
TIMES (London), Nov. 16,2001 (describing British legislative reaction to ajudicial
decision that exposed a gap in their previous anti-cloning law, the 1990 Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act). Japan has also banned SCNT cloning of
humans. See Ministry Bans Cloning Technology for Humans, DAILY YOMIURI
(Japan), July 29, 1998, at 2.
78 Colum Lynch, U.S. Seeks to Extend Ban on Cloning, WASH. POST, Feb. 27,
2002, at A8. The U.N. General Assembly is scheduled to decide in August, 2002,
whether to begin negotiations on a treaty along these lines. Id.79 See, e.g., To Clone or Not To Clone, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Mar. 19-26, 1997,
at 286 (quoting President Clinton's warning in an executive order issued to prohibit
the use of federal research funds for human cloning research).
80 See, e.g., Catholic Med. Ass'n, Human Cloning: Position Paper of the
Catholic Medical Association, reprinted in 15 ISSUES L. & MED. 323, 323-24
(2000) (describing the cloning of human beings as a "violation of the natural moral
law"); Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1997,
at 17 (detailing the ethical case against the cloning of humans).
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convinced of the fundamental correctness of their position, and both the
people and the sincerity of their beliefs are entitled to great respect.
To some degree, adherents of this view also tend to be pro-life and
against liberalized abortion-on-demand. It may be more accurate to state
that, among the pro-life group, there is also overwhelming opposition to
cloning humans. This is because anti-cloning sentiment is much more
widespread than even the basic pro-life position, which itself is held by a
substantial portion of the populace, depending on exactly how the issue is
framed. Many pro-choice advocates are also adamantly opposed to cloning,
on the basis of the perceived degradation and exploitation of human beings
for unwise or inappropriate purposes.
On the pro-life side of the anti-cloning coalition, people who believe
that it is wrong for persons intentionally to end the life of an unborn human
fetus under many or all circumstances also often believe it is wrong, or at
least not constitutionally protected, to create human life using "unnatural"
or "artificial" means. For some, this belief extends to in vitro fertilization
as well."' In part, this objection to in vitro fertilization stems from the fact
that there are inevitably some failures along the way, with some num-
ber---even sizable numbers-of human embryos created and eventually
discarded during the process.
At present, this point applies with much greater force to cloning than
to in vitro fertilization. As previously mentioned, cloning by SCNT is still
a process with a very low success rate, even when cloning frogs or sheep.
Until and unless major advancements are made in the technology and
technique, it is reasonable to expect that there will be vast numbers of
failures, i.e., discarded embryos, for every cloned individual that survives,
whether frog, sheep, or human being. Of course, where the objective is not
a successful pregnancy and live birth but rather medical or scientific
research, as in therapeutic cloning, this problem is greatly intensified.
Experimentation on human beings has long been considered unethical,
absent the voluntary consent of a subject with legal capacity to give
consent.8 2 Moreover, experimentation is not ethical where it would be
likely to result in injury, disability, or death of the experimental subject.83
Some commentators see these principles as relating to the dignity and rights
81See Clarke D. Forsythe, Legal Perspectives On Cloning: Human Cloning and
the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 469, 539-40 (1998).
82 See United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), 2 Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, at
181-82 (1949).
83 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2763-64 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1995).
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of unborn humans, and thus powerful arguments in favor of anti-cloning
legislation. 4
Among the core problems with this loosely-knit web of objections is
the inexorable tendency of opposition to cloning to lead to opposition to
other things. To the extent anti-cloning sentiment is rooted in religious
doctrine, there are important First Amendment concerns implicated in any
marriage of religion and legal action. If religion-based belief is permitted
to manifest itself in a ban of cloning, then similar arguments could next
target in vitro fertilization, stem cell research, or abortion. As we shall see
later in this Article, there are doctrinal strands that tie cloning to each of
these, and more.
B. Legal Grounds
Some commentators have posited legal objections to the cloning of
humans. These concerns focus on questions regarding the rights of the child
of cloning, issues concerning inheritance and parenthood, and related
problems.8 5 These are ancillary to the other anti-cloning arguments and are
probably insufficient in isolation to justify such legislation. However,
because they could form a portion of a broader, more comprehensive
justification for a ban, it is appropriate to discuss them briefly here.
For example, legislatures might assert that a cloning ban is necessary
to prevent physical harm to the children of cloning. If these children are at
greater risk of birth defects, including deformities and susceptibility to
illness and early death, this could be adduced as evidence in favor of a ban
on cloning. 6 Clearly, there is a legitimate public policy cause for concern
if the cloning of humans is accompanied by a high probability of serious
abnormalities, but this objection is persuasive only insofar as it argues for
temporary restrictions and narrowly tailored regulations while further
animal experiments are conducted. Low success rates in the union of DNA
and an enucleated egg, the implantation of the resulting embryo in a
woman's uterus, and the carrying of the fetus to term without miscarriage
could all form an additional basis for restrictions or temporary moratoria,
albeit with less legal justification, for reasons to be discussed later.
" See, e.g., Forsythe, supra note 81, at 532-34.
8' See, e.g., Mona S. Amer, Breaking the Mold: Human Embryo Cloning and
Its Implications for a Right to Individuality, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1684-88
(1996).
86 Note, Human Cloning and Substantive Due Process, 111 HARV. L. REV.
2348, 2362-63 (1998); Andrews, supra note 74, at 649-52.
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Another legal concern involves potential confusion as to family lineage
and kinship, and the impact such confusion could have on the rights and
duties implicated in the familial relationship within the legal system. Would
the donor of the nuclear DNA be recognized as a relative of the cloned
child, to a greater extent or. to the same extent as the donor of the
epucleated egg (which contributes the mDNA as well as cytoplasm to the
child of cloning)? Does the contribution of nuclear DNA or enucleated egg
by a third-party, i.e., someone not part of the family unit within which the
child will be reared, entitle the contributor to any rights or bind the
contributor with any responsibilities regarding the child? These issues are
relevant to varying degrees depending on who is donating the nuclear DNA
and who is donating the enucleated egg.
Some scenarios present a negligible risk of legal dispute as to lineage
and kinship, as where parents clone their own child, using the child as the
donor of the nuclear DNA and the mother as the source of the enucleated
egg. The child born through these means would still have the same
biological parents as the first child, with no outside source of DNA or m-
DNA."7 In other situations, as where a person clones himself or herself,
perhaps as a method of reproduction for a single person or an infertile or
same-sex couple, or where a couple wishes to clone an unrelated third
party, the kinship issues can be somewhat more complex. Still, the law has
proved to be robust to the challenge of sorting out gestational, genetic, and
social parentage in modem varieties of assisted reproduction, such as
gamete donation and surrogate motherhood. Cloning is not fundamentally
distinguishable from--and may in some respects be superior to--other
forms of assisted reproduction."8 Artificial insemination, in vitro fertiliza-
87 See John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L.
REv. 1371, 1393-94 (1998).88 Id. at 1424-30. For example, when cloning is utilized, there should generally
be no question as to the identity and legal rights and duties of the DNA donor. This
is not always the case with other forms of assisted reproduction, in which gametes
may be obtained from anonymous and extra-familial sources. See, e.g., Jaycee B.
v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 696 (4th Dist. 1996) (dealing with an
arrangement by which a married couple hired a surrogate mother to carry and give
birth to a baby developed from an embryo created from the ovum and spermatozoa
of anonymous donors, and the divorce of the married couple prior to the child's
birth); Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357-62 (App. Div. 1994) (order
of filiation granted to a homosexual man who fathered a daughter by donating
spermatozoa to a lesbian couple for artificial insemination). See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 827 (1997)
(discussing some of the complex parentage problems spawned by the use of
artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization).
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tion, gamete intrafallopian transfer, and zygote intrafallopian transfer all
have become familiar means of assisted reproduction, each with technologi-
cal and legal advantages and disadvantages; 9 cloning would not be an
exception.
C. Slippery Slope Grounds
The prospect of cloning humans seems to have special power to
provoke slippery slope arguments in opposition. Largely because of
rampant ignorance concerning the facts of life as applied to cloning, an
array of horrific consequences has been posited as a possible, if not
probable, outgrowth of legal cloning of humans.
An oft-repeated concern is that cloning could be employed to mass-
produce people, particularly those with tendencies toward violence and
evil, such as an army of Hitlers.9° The (false) assumption, fed by the
fantasies of popular entertainments, is that cloning allows for an easy,
assembly-line type of replication of people, almost akin to running off
limitless copies on a photocopier machine.9' A corollary of this combines
anti-cloning opinion with fear of modem genetic engineering to yield the
horrific prospect of legions of transgenically enhanced super-warriors or
arch-terrorists. 2 Suffice it to say that the genes have not as yet been
identified that specifically code for such peculiar traits as: (1) extraordinary
susceptibility to brainwashing and submission to an evil super villain's
commands; (2) affinity for self-destruction; (3) skill in modem weapon
usage; (4) Hercules-like physical strength; and (5) a Bruce Lee degree of
adeptness in martial arts. Maybe someday.
Given the extreme examples of eugenics during the twentieth century,
some fear that cloning would be widely used to select for, and select
against, particular genetic traits, possibly through governmental coercion.
If modern societies produced compulsory sterilization, what would prevent
89 See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERG-
ING TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 86-88 (1995); Katz, supra note 10,
at 23-27; Elizabeth A. Pitrolo, Comment, The Birds, the Bees, and the Deep
Freeze: Is There International Consensus in the Debate Over Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technologies?, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 147, 168-204 (1996).
" See Michael A. Goldman, Human Cloning: Science Fact and Fiction, 8 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 103, 103 (1998).
9' Robertson, supra note 87, at 1418.92 See, e.g., ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 10-12 (1932) (The novel
describes the transgenic subservient class of citizens created by despots to do their
bidding.).
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them from harnessing cloning to generate the genotypes and phenotypes
they favor?93
Another objection posits that legal cloning would usher in an era in
which cloning becomes a serious competitor to, if not the predominant form
of, human reproduction. Under what might be termed the "sex is dead"
scenario, children of cloning would become so numerous relative to the
children produced through traditional means that the human gene pool
would be impoverished. Certain genotypes would be replicated repeatedly,
swamping the gene pool with sameness. Genetic diversity would diminish,
leaving the human species with less resources for natural selection and
evolution, and thus less capable of evolving resistance to disease, changed
environmental factors, or other eventualities calling for a deep and varied
reservoir of genetic raw materials.94 Furthermore, society itself would
become less diverse, less interesting, and less genuine as people were
replicated from a limited number of popular templates.95 The "sex is dead"
theory and its prophesies that the gene pool will be drained might be
persuasive but for the fact that, as compared to conventional coital
reproduction, cloning will always be: (1) much more expensive; (2) much
riskier; and (3) much less fun.
D. Psycho-Social Grounds
Several potential psycho-social problems have been adumbrated,
centering around the difficulties a child of cloning might encounter.96 In
93 See PHILIPR. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 94, 105-10 (1991) (discussing the
involuntary sterilization of some 60,000 people in the United States, 1907-1963,
and approximately 3,500,000 in Nazi Germany, 1933-1945).
94 See George B. Johnson, Editorial, WhatRights Should a Cloned Human Have?,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 20, 1997, at B7; Pizzuli, supra note 22, at 560.
9' Pizzulli, supra note 22, at 559-60. It has become nearly obligatory in the
scholarly literature on cloning to mention Michael Jordan as a likely candidate for
repeated cloning. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 74, at 648; Robertson, supra note
87, at 1384. Ever the contrarian, I might offer instead the possibility of cloning
baseball superstar and new single-season home run champion Barry Bonds,
although old-fashioned sexual reproduction has evidently been quite adequate to
allow him to surpass, beyond anyone's wildest dreams, even the stellar major
league record established by his father, Bobby Bonds. See also the similar
examples of Ken Griffey Jr. and Sr., Bret and Bob Boone, and other cases in which
the non-cloned sons of major league baseball players far surpassed their fathers'
outstanding achievements.
" See Andrews, supra note 74, at 652-56 (hypothesizing several psychological
drawbacks related to cloning and crediting their credibility); Vernon J. Ehlers, The
Case Against Human Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 523, 526-27 (1999).
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that there has never been a successful cloning of a human being, one is
entirely free and without fear of definitive contrary evidence to postulate
a host of psycho-social challenges that might be collectively denominated
post-cloning syndrome ("PCS").
Persons afflicted with PCS might suffer from a reduced sense of self,
or at least a lessened sense of individuality or personal autonomy.97 A
sentient human being who learns at some stage of life that he or she was
launched on the path toward birth by SCNT rather than good old-fashioned
fertilization might feel like a product rather than a person. There would be
the knowledge that someone else has the identical complement of nuclear
DNA (albeit not mDNA), and perhaps that others also possess the exact
same set of DNA in their nuclei. For these people, there could be psycho-
logical trauma in knowing that they are not completely unique in the
genetic composition of their nuclei.9"
A related aspect of PCS might be the harm to a person's psyche from
knowing that he or she has the same nuclear DNA as a particular individual
and presumably, is foreordained to the same genetically-determined path
in life. Assuming the identity of the DNA donor is known to the child of
cloning, he or she would be able to view the future to some extent by
looking at the donor. Predisposition to a variety of genetically based
medical conditions, adult physical appearance, aging patterns, intellectual
capacity, and other important phenotypic manifestations of a person's
genetic material would be on display. Perhaps foreknowledge of some of
these attributes would be disturbing, assuming that the DNA donor
represents a future that is frightening or unappealing to the child of
cloning.99
The opposite problem could eventuate when a person is cloned,
specifically to manifest a particular trait, and then he or she does not fulfill
this destiny, whether through injury, illness, or other of life's vicissitudes.
The person could experience pressure to conform to the desired life
template, and suffer feelings of rejection and inadequacy when he or she
does not. °10 Particularly where the person is aware that he or she was
intended specifically to excel at some special field of endeavor, there may
97 NBAC REPORT, supra note 17, at ii, 66-68.
98 Robertson, supra note 87, at 1411-18 (describing and analyzing these objec-
tions to cloning and concluding that they are not likely to constitute sufficient
justification for a ban).
9 See generally Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the Culture of
Motherhood, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 967 (1996) (examining evidence that access to
genetic screening information about oneself can be psychologically harmful to a
person).
100 Andrews, supra note 74, at 653.
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be a sense of being, in essence, a defective product, and parents or siblings
might treat the person as such.10
It is possible that PCS could also entail psychological distress
generated by the treatment the child of cloning receives from others in
society. It may be that these children would be the target of insults and
cruel jokes, and that some "normal" people would shun them or otherwise
make them feel unwelcome. They might be ostracized because of their
genetic origin. Such unfair and discriminatory actions might be especially
common, and especially damaging, during the childhood years when
youthful people can be prone to single out others who are perceived as
different. This, of course, presupposes that people beyond the immediate
family would be aware that a particular child began life through the cloning
process. But this would not be the case unless someone in the family chose
to reveal the information publicly--there would be no way someone could
discern a clonal origin merely by looking at a person. Even striking
physical similarities between the DNA donor and the child of cloning--the
"spitting image" or "chip off the old block" phenomenon---could very
plausibly be attributed to traditional family resemblance, just as has always
been recognized. Public disclosure of a clonal origin would be a matter
within the discretion of the family, absent an ethical breach by a health care
provider with knowledge of the situation or DNA analysis.
It also has been suggested, paradoxically, that cloning would at once
diminish parental ties and expand parental control over the genetic destiny
of children. The NBAC Report included a "concern about a degradation in
the quality of parenting and family life," with impersonalization of the
parent-child relationship and children being only conditionally accepted by
their parents, because of the supposed manufacturing-like aspects of the
cloning process. 0 2 This view holds that children of cloning might be
viewed as manufactured products or possessions, not as people, with less
than usual tolerance of deviations from parental expectations or, to use the
language of manufacturing and contracts, specifications.'013 It also decries
the "total parental control over the genetic destiny of the child" that cloning
offers.' 04
V. WHY WOULD ANYONE WANT TO CLONE A HUMAN?
Given this rather extensive list of arguments against the cloning of
humans, one might presume that it is chiefly a dead issue--few would want
101 Willgoos, supra note 62, at 107-08.
102 NBAC REPORT, supra note 17, at ii.
103 Forsythe, supra note 81, at 536-39.
1o4 Id. at 536.
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to clone a person if these arguments are valid. 1°5 Yet cloning is very much
a live issue, both figuratively and literally.
Initially, of course, some people are interested in becoming the first
successfully to clone a human being, or the first person to be cloned.
Whether driven by scientific zeal, a desire for fame and a place in history,
the yearning for riches, or some combination thereof, there is a special
allure associated with being the first to cross a chasm of this magnitude.
But this impetus would quickly dissipate once the chasm is conquered. Few
remember the second or third person to master any significant scientific or
technological challenge. So let us consider what other reasons might persist
beyond the pioneering phase of human clonal research.
There may be a desire by family members to clone a beloved dying
relative, especially a child. The impetus to clone would be particularly
strong where the family is unable to have another child through traditional
procreation, but it would be a natural reaction of loving parents to the
impending death of any child under any circumstances. Parents of a child
critically injured in an accident or attack, or stricken with a devastating
communicable disease, may have a powerful urge for something approach-
ing a second chance. By cloning the dying child, the parents could feel that
they are in some measure providing their child with a, second chance at a
full life. Simultaneously, they would afford themselves a second chance to
experience parenting and relating to their child, this time for many more
years. Obviously, the new child would have a new brain, with no recollec-
tion of any experiences from the life of the first child, but the genetic
identity of the two would be a powerful factor moving grief-stricken
parents toward the cloning decision.
Couples or individuals may also want to use cloning as a means of
having children, apart from any desire to replace a lost loved one.
Presumably, cloning would be an attractive option mostly in situations that
do not present many alternatives; it would be a rarity, not the norm."0 6
Given the prohibitively high expense and low success rate likely to be
associated with cloning for the foreseeable future, people are not apt to
attempt cloning unless it is the only way to have, as it were, "children of
their own." If there is a social stigma that arises against cloning, that would
'05 See Katz, supra note 10, at 12-13; Dorothy C. Wertz, Twenty-one Arguments
Against Human Cloning, and Their Responses, THE GENE LETTER (Aug. 1, 1998),
at http://www.geneletter.com/archives/twentyonearguments.html (listing numer-
ous arguments in opposition to the cloning of humans and offering rebuttals to
each).
'06 See Lee M. Silver, Popular Cloning Versus Scientific Cloning in Ethical
Debates, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 53 (2000/2001).
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be a further disincentive. Prospective parents would probably exhaust their
options regarding conventional procreation, adoption, and in vitro
fertilization before turning to cloning, absent a strong personal philosophi-
cal drive to explore a new reproductive frontier.
One exception might be in the case of a couple, one member of whom
is a carrier of a genetic disease, and who do not want to accept the risk of
transmitting the disease or the gene to their children. °7 They could clone
the member who lacks the disease-linked gene and thus ensure that their
child will not possess the undesired gene, or, if they already have a child
who is free of the gene, they could clone that child." 8 Situations in which
the combination of two recessive copies of a gene that were each carried
unexpressed by the two parents constitute one of the most common classes
of genetic disorders, encompassing serious conditions such as sickle cell
anemia, cystic fibrosis, Tay-Sachs disease, and PKU, and cloning would
greatly reduce the incidence of these harms. 9 Cloning would also
significantly lower the risk of the other most prevalent variety of genetic
abnormalities, i.e., Down syndrome (the presence of an abnormal number
of chromosomes)." 0 Thus, in contradistinction to the fears that cloning
would be unacceptably dangerous, with myriad dead or deformed embryos
and babies among the casualties, cloning may actually be safer and less
risky than even coital reproduction under some circumstances."'
Another exception could involve couples, at least one member of which
cannot produce viable gametes. Cloning would enable these couples to
refrain from relying on anonymous donors of sperm (as in a sperm bank),
or egg donors from outside the couple, and allow the two to use only the
genetic material of one member of the couple. Moreover, if the male
contributes the DNA and the female the enucleated egg, the resulting child
would have the father's nuclear DNA and the mother's mDNA, permitting
both members to contribute to the child's genetic makeup. Likewise, both
members of lesbian couples could contribute to their child's genetic
structure by having one woman donate the DNA and the other the
enucleated egg.
Infertile heterosexual couples, single persons, and homosexual life
partners' 2 would comprise the majority of people exploring the cloning
'07NBAC REPORT, supra note 17, at 78-79.
108 Andrews, supra note 74, at 647-48; Robertson, supra note 87, at 1379.
109 See KOLATA, supra note 15, at 239-42; SILVER, supra note 20, at 103-04.
11 See SILVER, supra note 20, at 103-04.
"1 See Katz, supra note 10, at 12.
112 Some gay activists, such as the Clone Rights United Front, have protested
anti-cloning legislation, seeing cloning as an opportunity for same-sex couples to
experience the procreative process. See Anita Manning, Pressing a "Right" to
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option, just as they do for the more well-established alternatives to con-
ventional reproduction. The same basic yearnings that drive people to
adopt, to become foster parents, to employ surrogate mothers, or to attempt
in vitro fertilization, would apply to the decision to clone. But this is not to
say that all the alternatives have identical appeal to all people. Many
choose to adopt despite an ability to procreate, because of a desire to help
a child in need who has already been born, as my wife and I have done with
our own daughter from the Peoples' Republic of China. In vitro fertilization
is attractive to people who wish to have the genes of both members of the
couple represented in the couple's children, but who cannot do so without
the aid of this technique. Cloning would be a way for single persons not in
a coupled relationship to contribute their genes to their own children, or for
one member of same-sex couples to do the same." 3
Each of these forms of having children satisfy certain profound human
needs, each in its own way. The tendency of people to prefer one means
over the others may be influenced by religious beliefs, societal norms, and
the importance to each person of passing one's own genes on to the next
generation. This last variable is paramount for some, whether rooted in a
belief in the primacy of genes as the determinants of one's life or a
conviction that a child is more fully one's "own" if that child possesses the
genes of the parent(s). This position can attain its fullest expression on the
individual level in the case of cloning, because no one's genes, other than
those of the DNA donor, will be present in the child.
Adherents of genetic determinism may offer another reason in support
of the cloning of humans: this technique maximizes our ability to ensure
that certain admired persons have the opportunity to transmit their genes
across the generational boundary. Of course, which persons are admired is
very much a personal decision in the eyes and mind of the beholder. For
some, there is no doubt (presumably after long and careful study, compari-
son, and analysis) that the one person on earth whose genes absolutely must
be replicated is, in fact, that person. Perhaps a substantial number of other
people would agree in principle regarding some subset of such me-first
potential cloners-Nobel laureates, Pulitzer Prize winners, and decorated
Clone Humans: Some Gays Foresee Reproduction Option, USA TODAY, Mar. 6,
1997, at ID. Some lesbians have noted the advantage of reproduction withoutthe
direct involvement of men, including anonymous sperm donors who may have
undesirable genetic traits. Id. See also Silver, supra note 106, at 54. For more
information regarding the Clone Rights United Front, see Clone Rights United
Front Homepage, at http://www.clonerights.com (last visited June 18, 2002).
113 Robertson, supra note 87, at 1381-82 (mentioning additional possible
reasons for cloning).
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heroes, for instance. In other cases, a person's very lofty view of his or her
own unique merit may be shared by no one else, yet that person may be
totally committed to donating genetic self-copies to the world of tomorrow.
A variant of this theme would involve not a sense of egocentric
superiority so much as a desire for physical immortality. Some people, in
coming to terms with their own mortality, might conclude that they possess
the means to live on through cloning themselves. Either owing to a
misguided misunderstanding of cloning or a powerful adherence to "genetic
determinism"1 14 or "genetic essentialism,"' 5 these persons could decide to
clone themselves as a form of proactive reincarnation. Such belief in the
primacy of genetics may be quite misguided," 6 but it can also be
tenacious,1 7 and may lead to a cloning decision. This could be conceptual-
ized as a contemporary manifestation of the poet's plea that we "do not go
gentle into that good night" but rather "rage, rage against the dying of the
light."'18 If already terminally ill, the DNA donor might entrust the
clonally-originated child to the care of a close relative or friend, with the
injunction to bring up the child so as to honor and emulate the donor. Or,
if the donor still enjoys sufficiently good health and the time to rear the
child, the donor can personally teach the child in the manner deemed
appropriate, complete with information about the donor's own family
history and traditions, likes and dislikes, and various other life patterns.
Possibly some devoted followers of particular individuals might feel so
strongly about their idol's value that they would be willing to pay to clone
him or her or serve as a surrogate mother. This would have to be an
especially potent form of devotion because of the great expense involved
and the requirement of finding a willing surrogate mother to carry every
SCNT embryo to term, one embryo per surrogate at a time. Presumably the
consent and cooperation of the object of such hero worship would be
114 See NBAC REPORT, supra note 17, at 32.
15 Steve Jones, Arguing Ethics, Forfeiting Progress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
1998, at A17.
1.. See Robert Wachbroit, Should We Cut This Out? Human Cloning Isn't as
Scary as It Sounds, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1997, at Cl (describing genetic
determinism as "not only false, but pernicious; it invokes memories of pseudo-
scientific racist and eugenic programs premised on the belief that what we value
in people is entirely dependent on their genetic endowment or the color of their
skin").
17 According to some polls, thirty to forty percent of Americans believe in
genetic determinism. See Ronald Bailey, The Twin Paradox: What Exactly is
Wrong with Cloning People?, REASON, May 1997, at 52.
"I DYLAN THOMAS, COLLECTED POEMS OF DYLAN THOMAS 1934-52 (1971).
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essential, in order to supply the requisite DNA in a viable form. It is highly
unlikely that anyone could be cloned without his or her knowledge and
consent, absent the collusion of health care providers with access to living
somatic cell samples." 9
One can imagine some sinister examples, in which a modem-day
despot, zealot, terrorist, or arch-criminal either attempts to create multiple
self-clones or is urged to do so by disciples. Particularly charismatic,
delusional, powerful, ruthless, and/or wealthy figures might be able to
spearhead a successful self-cloning campaign on a limited scale. One might
denominate this the Hitler Syndrome or the Osama bin Laden Plot, with the
name of the ultra-villain subject to whatever current events and cultural
debates are dominant. On a less ominous note, certain celebrities might
enjoy an extreme strain of hero-worship in which their fans provide funds
and wombs for their cloning. Sometimes, such pronounced devotion does
not blossom until after the death of the idol; in these cases, cloning would
be impossible unless somehow the necessary cell samples had been
obtained in advance by forward-looking persons. Thus, what we might call
the Elvis Option would often be impracticable, notwithstanding the
posthumous devotion some celebrities attract.
Additional utilitarian motivations for cloning may exist. For example,
some people might want to create a clone of themselves for the primary or
secondary purpose of securing a compatible potential donor of organs such
as kidneys. Because of the genetic identity of donor and child of cloning,
there should be drastically diminished risks of rejection of the transplanted
organ in these situations. One presumes that this use of cloning would be
limited to non-essential organs, blood, and bone marrow, and that the law
would never allow a living, viable, child of cloning to have his or her heart
or liver harvested for the benefit of the donor. Aside from the extreme polar
situation wherein a person creates a self-clone for the express purpose of
killing the child of cloning and cannibalizing him or her for vital organs,
and presuming both the proper normal care and education of the child and
the voluntary and informed consent on the part of the child to the donation
of any non-essential organs and other bodily components, this could be
viewed as a legitimate reason for cloning. As an actuating motive, it lacks
the emotional appeal of the naked clone scenario soon to be discussed, but
it may be an understandable rationale, especially in the case of individuals
with particularly acute vulnerability to certain serious medical conditions.
"
9 See Robertson, supra note 87, at 1446 (speculating that eventually minuscule
amounts of DNA from such sources as saliva residue on postage stamps might be
usable for cloning).
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. It is possible that cloning could also be employed to clone only specific
tissues or organs, not as part of an entire free-standing post-birth organism,
but as discrete and isolated entities. Indeed, in early 2002 there were some
preliminary reports that researchers in Massachusetts "used cells derived
from cloned cow embryos to grow kidney-like organs that function and are
not rejected when implanted into adult cows.' 2° If verified and perfected,
such methodology could allow the use of cloning to produce "personalized,
genetically matched organs for transplantation," or, more precisely, re-
implantation into the same individual from which the organ's DNA was
originally extracted, and might dramatically reduce the need to rely on
organ donors in the future.'21 Similarly, cloning may be very useful in stem
cell research, which could hold the key to unlocking many intractable
medical problems. Such therapeutic cloning may be an enormously
powerful tool for medical science.
All of the motivations discussed would necessarily entail use of the
SCNT and not the embryo-splitting method of cloning. This is the case
because only the SCNT technique allows the cloning of an individual who
has already been born. Embryo-splitting can create multiple people with the
identical genotype, but the source must be embryonic cells of a very early
stage. Once an embryo develops beyond the blastomere phase and consists
of more than just a few cells, embryo splitting is no longer an option--and
this is certainly true for later-stage fetuses, newborns, babies, toddlers,
children, adolescents, and adults. Moreover, most, if not all, of the reasons
why people might want to clone do not apply to the embryo-splitting
method. Rather than replicating the genes of a known person-whether
self, life partner, a child, or an admired individual--the embryo-splitting
technique clones an embryo, essentially making multiple children out of
what ordinarily would only become one child. And an embryo, of course,
is produced through the union of egg and sperm cells, with an equal genetic
contribution from both mother and father, i.e., a new, unique genotype, not
a replication of any one person's genes.
Some of the aforementioned reasons for cloning humans are of broader
and deeper appeal than others. Many people may empathize with bereaved
parents over their desire for their dead child to live again, in a manner of
speaking. There is also a poignancy in the longing of people to have
120 Rick Weiss, Scientists Claim an Advance in Therapeutic Cloning, WASH.
POST, Jan. 30, 2002, at A3.
... Id. In addition to obviating the need to search for available organs, this
technology would presumably eliminate most of the risk of rejection possible upon
the transplant of organs from one genetically unique individual to another. Id.
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children to love and nurture, despite the obstacles nature or society has
placed in their path. The other goals of cloning might not be as popular,
either in terms of the number of people who would be ready to implement
them at their own expense and risk or in the level of approval they would
attract in public opinion. Some would be unambiguously unpopular, to say
the least. But this Article has established that there are reasons why people
might want to clone human beings, and that these reasons are both complex
and varied. This Article will now evaluate the constitutionality of
legislation that would ban or severely circumscribe the cloning of humans.
VI. Is ANTI-CLONING LEGISLATION CONSTITUTIONAL?
In light of the objections to cloning, the reasons why people would
want to clone, and the multiple pieces of legislation on both the state and
federal level that touch on the cloning of human beings, the key question
becomes whether anti-cloning laws are constitutional. Clearly, the answer
to this question can only be adumbrated through a process of comparison
and analogy, in that there is no case law directly on point at this early
juncture in the history of human clonal activity.
I will analyze this issue primarily in terms of the Human Cloning
Prohibition Act of 2001 ("HCPA") because this bill, sweeping in scope, has
already been passed by the United States House of Representatives, and
was actively debated, although not voted on, by the Senate during the first
half of 2002. It is a complete and comprehensive ban on the SCNT method
of cloning humans irrespective of purpose, and it has no sunset provi-
sions.122 If the HCPA approach survives constitutional scrutiny, it is reason-
able to presume that less ambitious legislative restrictions would survive as
well.
I must emphasize that the following analysis is not an attempt to predict
what the current Supreme Court or some future Supreme Court would
actually do,'23 but is rather a suggestion as to what they should do, to be
consistent with stare decisis and the rule of law. As will be explained, much
of the relevant precedent rests on questionable and non-textual constitu-
tional grounds, and has often been produced, case by case, by the narrowest
possible majorities or even pluralities. The fragile coalitions that yielded
these cases could be shattered if even one justice is replaced by a person of
differing judicial views on such matters. In an effort to focus on legal
122 Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R 2505, 107th Cong. (2001).
123 See Katz, supra note 10, at 44 (noting that the Court's view of the cloning
of humans, as with other issues of reproductive freedom, may be "particularly
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of personnel changes of the Court").
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principle and not on political maneuvering, I will not attempt to foretell the
future, but only to sort through the doctrinal strands that loosely knit the
jurisprudence, and see where the threads lead us.
i One can hypothesize several ways in which a legal challenge to the
HCPA and its state analogues might be mounted. The facts could be
arrayed in a variety of patterns, depending on who was attempting to clone
a human, the motives for doing so, and the specific governmental response;
Indeed, the breadth of many of the anti-cloning bills and statutes invites
legal challenges on multiple fronts and increases the probability that the
courts will find constitutional defects. By essaying to ban all cloning of
human beings regardless of reason or circumstances, the legislators have
made it likely that some cases will be brought in which very earnest,
sympathy-attracting people plead for redress of their grievances against a
Procrustean anti-,cloning legal regime. It may be that courts would hold
some limited restrictions on the cloning of humans permissible, while
striking down more sweeping bans. Let us examine how and why.
A. The Naked Clone Scenario and Reproductive Rights
First, we will consider the most favorable scenario for a successful
legal attack on the anti-cloning laws. This is the "naked clone" situation,
the name of which constitutes the title of this Article. 2 4 The term "naked
clone" is used to. highlight one particularly propitious concatenation of
circumstances, in which well-meaning, loving, child-focused people are
barred from cloning despite being motivated by some of the best, most
altruistic, and most basic human impulses. The parents, perhaps already
devastated by the terminal illness of their child, would be bereft a second
time, having lost the chance to give life another chance through cloning.
124 Throughout this Article the author attempts to use the term "child of
cloning" rather than "clone" to refer to a human being who begins life through the
cloning process. He believes "child of cloning" is preferable, because it emphasizes
the personhood of the individual rather than the process by which he or she came
into being. To call a person a "clone" is akin to calling someone conceived through
in vitro fertilization an "IVF" or a "test tube." However, when the term "naked
clone" is used, he opts for the word "clone" intentionally to highlight the negative
prejudices, ignorant misconceptions, and pejorative use of quasi-scientific language
that have so often accompanied the debate on the cloning of humans. In actuality,
if one wishes to be perfectly accurate, there is another term preferable even to
"child of cloning" when referring to a child born through the cloning process. That
term is "child."
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The child of cloning would be naked in the sense of being devoid of
protection, stripped of legal rights, and without any refuge from the
government that forbids him or her even to exist. The privacy rights of the
parents and child would be subordinated to the state interests, leaving the
child of cloning naked and exposed to the dictates of the government.
The naked clone scenario ultimately would most likely bring about a
holding that invalidates the anti-cloning legislation. Because the naked
clone scenario casts the issue in terms of reproductive rights and personal
privacy concerns, it would push the courts into the same legal territory that
embraces the concepts of abortion, contraception, assisted reproduction,
and related topics. Modem jurisprudence of the past few decades would
pose a formidable obstacle to judges who might find the cloning of humans
abhorrent and who would want to uphold the ban.
Is the cloning of a human being a form of reproduction, somewhere in
the same category as conventional procreation and in vitro fertilization, and
thus a fundamental right-procreative liberty-that can only be circum-
scribed if the government can demonstrate a compelling state interest in
doing so and tailors its restrictions narrowly? 5 Are there satisfactory
responses to the various anti-cloning arguments outlined previously? Does
a decision to clone a person implicate privacy rights? 6 Does the recent
accretion of abortion, contraception, and assisted reproduction jurispru-
dence embrace a constitutional right to clone, at least under some circum-
stances?' Is there a moral/normative basis for including cloning within the
pantheon of constitutionally protective reproductive rights? The correct
answer to all five questions is yes.
The Supreme Court has held, in a long line of cases, that the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which proscribe
the deprivation of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"
125See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Strict scrutiny has been the standard
of review when fundamental rights are affected. A governmental regulation of a
fundamental right will only be upheld if narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve
a compelling governmental interest. Id.
11
6 See generally Jed Rubenfeld, The Right ofPrivacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737,
740-52 (1989) (offering a case-by-case outline of the development of the right to
privacy in the courts).
12 ' See Katz, supra note 10, at 40-51. See generally Stephanie J. Hong, Note,
And "Cloning " Makes Three: A Constitutional Comparison Between Cloning and
OtherAssisted Reproductive Technologies, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741 (1999);
Lawrence Wu, Note, Family Planning Through Human Cloning: Is There a
Fundamental Right?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1461 (1998).
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have a substantive component which protects substantive fundamental
rights and liberties, both constitutionally enumerated"' and implied. 29 The
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence reflects more robust
constitutional protection for rights or liberty interests that implicate
particularly important types of choices or "zones of privacy,""' which
directly involve personal autonomy.' Once the Court recognizes such
rights, it will uphold legislation impinging on those rights only if it serves
a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to further that
interest. '2
Analysis of fundamental rights under the rubric of substantive due
process is complicated by the facts that the recognized rights to date have
not always been explicitly mentioned in the actual text of the Constitution,
and the Court has employed at least two tests to determine whether
fundamental rights exist, neither of which is particularly instructive.'33 One
test recognizes as fundamental those rights "that are 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if
[they] were sacrificed.""'34 Another test looks to history, recognizing as
fundamental those rights that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."'3 5 The tests are disjunctive, not conjunctive; the lack of a deep
historical and traditional foundation can be overcome through the
combination of a deeply personal choice and the implications of that choice
for firmly established liberty interests. 36 Recently, the Court appears to
have added a requirement or a caveat to these tests, that the Court must be
careful to describe the asserted fundamental liberty interest.
13
"2' See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961).
129 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
130 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977), quoting Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965).
131 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
'
32 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
1 See Lawton, supra note 12, at 332-34.
'3 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986), quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
'3 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192, quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (Powell, J., plurality).
136 See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 852-53 (upholding a substantive due
process claim despite powerful countervailing historical traditions).
137 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
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Although one can easily conclude that the precedent recognizes
procreation or reproduction as a firmly established fundamental right,138 the
Supreme Court has never explicitly dealt with its outer boundaries and
limitations. 39 When state-of-the-art assisted-reproduction technology meets
the primordial procreative process in the Court's chambers, the results are
not entirely predictable.
Under all ofthe rather vague and interrelated tests by which fundamen-
tal rights or fundamental liberty interests may be discerned by the Court,
the judicial fate of anti-cloning legislation will turn on the way the Court
frames the issue. 4 The question asked predetermines the answer received.
The narrow question, "Is there a fundamental right to clone human beings
for any and all purposes?" would doubtless be but a few paragraphs
removed from a resounding "no" in the Court's opinion. Conversely, if the
138 Within its substantive due process body of case law, the Supreme Court has
described procreation, the process of having children, as "one of the basic civil
rights of man." Skinnerv. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942).
Human reproduction has been considered not only a fundamental personal liberty
but also a vital interest at the center of privacy rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972) ("If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); Cleveland Bd.
ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) ("This right of personal privacy includes... personal
decisions 'relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education.' ") (citations omitted) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-53 (1973)). More recently, the Court has recognized that the liberty
interest safeguarded by the due process clause includes the right "to have children."
Washington, 521 U.S. at 720; Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 857 (reaffirming
the "recognized protection accorded to the liberty relating to intimate relationships,
the family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child.").
139 See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 35-40 (1994) (tracing the history of the legal right
to reproduction and arguing that the right applies to methods other than traditional
procreation as well). But see Ann MacLean Massie, Regulating Choice: A
Constitutional Law Response to ProfessorJohn A. Robertson 's Children of Choice,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 135, 162 (1995) (arguing against the extension of
constitutional protection to assisted reproduction in general).
'40 See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1057, 1065-71 (1990) (analyzing the
difference between the majority and dissent in Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-97, 199-
214, as turning on the level of narrowness or generality employed to frame the
issue in light of precedent).
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Court asks more expansively, "May the government forbid infertile couples
to choose, of their own volition, to use available means of modem
technology to have children?," the cloning clinics can confidently begin
construction of new facilities. Which question should the Court ask? It
depends on which view of cloning as a phenomenon prevails, and this will
be determined by the Court's evaluation of the arguments previously
outlined for and against cloning. 4' This, in tunm, depends on how closely
the Court's view of the potentialities and limitations of cloning approxi-
mates what could actually happen in the real world.
B. Psycho-Social Arguments: Cloning in the Real World
Some of the objections to cloning mentioned in Section IV of this
Article are so speculative that they resist analysis, particularly where they
hypothesize rampant objectification of children, psycho-social trauma, and
slippery-slope catastrophes. I will address the anti-cloning concerns by
focusing on scientific reality and by analogizing cloning to real-world
situations with which we are already familiar.
Some commentators have suggested that cloning is fundamentally
different from "natural" procreation and even in vitro fertilization.'42 This
viewpoint holds that cloning is not reproduction but replication, akin to
photocopying, and that the difference is of constitutional importance.'
4 3
Cloning has been excoriated as the moral and perhaps legal equivalent of
slavery or incest.'" But these views reflect both a misunderstanding of
cloning itself and an overemphasis on genotypic uniqueness as a prerequi-
site of personhood.
First, when the SCNT method is used, the mitochondrial DNA is not
identical as between the donor of the nuclear DNA and the child of cloning.
Their nuclear DNA will be the same, but their mDNA will be different,
because the child of cloning will receive hisor her mDNA from the donor
of the enucleated ovum. Thus, the two persons would not be truly identical
genetically-extremely similar, but not identical. But even if there were
'4' See discussion infra Parts IV, V.
142 See Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists,
16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 72 (1988) (positing that unconventional forms of
reproduction such as in vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood should not be
banned on the basis of speculative harms).
143 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 74, at 666, 669 (distinguishing cloning from
in vitro fertilization and surrogacy); George J. Annas, Human Cloning: Should the
United States Legislate Against It?, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 80.
'"See Andrews, supra note 74, at 667-69; Pizzulli, supra note 22, at 481.
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absolute, one hundred percent, genotypic identity between donor and child,
it has never been deemed legally significant that two persons are geneti-
cally indistinguishable. All of us in fact have seen or met pairs of people
who have exactly the same genetic codes, but these people were not
children of cloning. They were "produced" through a much more ancient
process.
Identical twins, or even identical siblings of more than two, are referred
to as identical because they possess the same genotype. Because of a
phenomenon occurring very early in the embryo's development, similar to
the embryo-splitting method of cloning, a mother can give birth to two or
more children with the same genetic structure and composition. Indeed,
identical twins are more alike genetically than a DNA donor and his or her
child of cloning because identical twins share the same mDNA as well as
the same nuclear DNA, and yet they are not identical in every aspect of
their physical, mental, and behavioral characteristics. 45
For millennia, human identical twins have been born, lived their lives,
and died. They were given individual names, nurtured as are other children,
and afforded the same legal rights as all other people. True, identical twins
may experience unusual parallels in their lives and life experiences, and
may enjoy particularly powerful relational bonds with one another, but they
have not been denied full legal recognition of their personhood. Neither
have they been found to lack individuality, dignity, or personal autonomy,
despite parents who dressed them alike, taught them alike, disciplined them
alike, and continually expressed their expectations that they would fulfill
parental expectations in like manner. They have generally managed to
endure any teasing and joking, good natured or otherwise, that was directed
at them because of their two-of-a-kind situation.
Certainly no one has argued that the genetic and environmental identity
between identical twins is a reason why they should not be allowed to exist.
A search of the scholarly legal literature has failed to unearth any article
asseverating that identical twins should be preemptively aborted because
to allow them to be born would be tantamount to a wrongful life tort.
Identical twins, with the identical nuclear DNA and the identical mDNA,
who share the same uterus at the same time, who are born within minutes
See Gerald E. McClearn et al., Substantial Genetic Influence on Cognitive
Abilities in Twins 80 orMore Years Old, 276 SCIENCE 1560, 1562 (1997) (finding
that sixty-two percent of general cognitive abilities in elderly identical twins was
attributable to genetic influences, but thirty-eight percent was due to environmental
factors). See also Richard Cohen, The Mad Scientist Bogeyman, WASH. POST, Aug.
7, 2001, at A15 (deriding popular and political opinions on the evils of cloning).
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of each other, and who grow up simultaneously in the identical home
environment subject to the same parental pressures, are still universally
viewed as having lives worth living. They may occasionally chafe at the
influence of parents who want them to dress alike, or who err on the side
of excess in ensuring absolutely identical treatment for both twins in all
things, but such are the types of annoyances that all children experience
from their parents-no worse, only different. Some quantum of annoyance
is the natural state of children with regard to their parents, and vice versa.
It comes with the territory.
As in virtually all aspects of life in which human beings are involved,
there is another side to the "problems" faced by identical twins. They may
find a great measure of comfort, support, and fulfillment in the ineffable
bond they feel to their identical sibling. 46 Perhaps more than most sisters
and brothers, they can cenjoy a sense of true companionship with one
another, an intangible emotional bridge that can span great expanses of time
and space. This level of familial union, powerful enough to unite people
throughout their lives with a special sense of shared essence, is something
many non-twins would envy and would covet in their own lives. Would
donor and child of cloning enjoy a unique bond as well? The experience of
scientific studies with identical twins suggests that this is a real possibility.
The commentators who theorize that parents would feel and exhibit less
emotional bonding to their children of cloning than to other children'47
ignore the special bonds often felt between identical twins. 48 One may
safely presume that the majority of people interested in cloning would do
so with one of three potential sources of DNA in mind: (1) themselves; (2)
their life partner; or (3) their own child. In two of these three naked clone
situations, a given parent would have a powerful genetic link to the child,
and in the third, the child would possess a profound genetic link to a
cherished loved one. Under all of these circumstances, if the evidence
regarding identical twins is any indication, parents may feel a stronger
emotional link to their children of cloning, not a weaker bond or a
commodity-like detachment. 49 These families may reasonably be expected
to enjoy a higher level of emotional bonding, greater mutual solicitude, and
'4 See Nancy L. Segal, Behavioral Aspects of Intergenerational Human
Cloning: What Twins Tell Us, 38 JURiMETRICS J. 57, 60 (1997).
147 See, e.g., Forsythe, supra note 81, at 536-40; Kass, supra note 80, at 21.
148 See Segal, supra note 146, at 60, 65 (reporting the special emotional bonds
enjoyed by many identical twins and the additional richness and closeness this
brings to the twins' lives).
14' See Robertson, supra note 87, at 1412.
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deeper shared understanding-far from the feared "despotism of the cloners
over the cloned," a reversion to the cruel practices of ancient Sparta, and
the depersonalized treatment of children as "artifacts" or "products."' 5 °
The genotypic identity between DNA donor and child of cloning is
properly viewed in the same light as identical twins, with, if anything, even
more powerful arguments in support of personhood and individuality. As
with identical twins, there may eventuate striking similarities in certain
aspects of life, but also differences.' Unlike identical twins, the donor and
child of cloning would be some years apart in age, often a generation apart,
with all the cultural and experiential divergences that implies. In all
circumstances except the situation in which parents seek to clone their own
child, the donor and child of cloning would have different parents, would
be carried in different uteri,'52 and would be raised in different household
environments. They would have different friends and close relatives, would
have different teachers, and would be shaped by many divergent environ-
mental factors.' They may well be more dissimilar than identical twins
reared apart. But irrespective of how similar they may be in terms of
genotype, phenotype, personality, and preferences, they would be every bit
as much individual persons as are identical twins under the law. Any
attempt to elide cloning with mechanical replication would not be capable
of formulating a legally significant deficiency in the naked clone.
This is true despite possible parental exertions to rear the child of
cloning to be the living replacement of a particular individual or a faithful
replica of a living exemplar. Under some of the scenarios we have
150 Kass, supra note 80, at 21.
15' See NBAC REPORT, supra note 17, at 33, 66; Segal, supra note 146, at 63
(discussing divergences among identical twins in such features as physical
characteristics, intellectual abilities, vocational interests, and social attitudes,
presumably due to the differential environments experienced at the prenatal,
perinatal, and postnatal stages); Richard Dawkins, Thinking Clearly About Clones:
How Dogma and Ignorance Get in the Way, FREE INQUIRY, June 22, 1997, at 13.
12 The first of many environments that affect human development is the uterus;
there is scientific evidence adumbrating the many effects of the uterine environ-
ment on traits as important as intelligence. See B. Devlin et al., The Heritability of
IQ, 388 NATURE 468, 469 (1997). Of course, the uterine environment and the
eventual human infant can be profoundly altered by such stressors as maternal
alcohol and tobacco use during pregnancy. See LAURA E. BERK, CHILD DEVELOP-
MENT 92-102 (4th ed. 1997).
1 See Goldman, supra note 90, at 112-13 (discussing the importance of many
pre-natal and post-natal environmental variables in determining the phenotypic
expression of even identical genotypes).
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envisioned, a person or couple might want to clone in order to give a dying
loved one "another chance," or to honor and emulate an admired person,
even oneself. In these situations, the caregivers could be expected to make
every effort to bring up the new child in the same manner as the DNA
donor. They might supply the same bedroom, toys, books, music, clothing,
games, lessons, and videos. They could try to recreate many of the same
cherished life experiences, such as favorite vacations, outings, activities,
and educational opportunities. They might try to narrow the range of
options and experiences open to the child. In short, they may do everything
that countless legions of parents have done throughout the ages in an
attempt to live vicariously through their children and to have them carry on
the family business and traditions. And, they (and their children) may be
just as surprised, pleased, and/or frustrated by the results.
The same is true for parents who choose to clone in the hope that their
child will display outstanding talents in some selected areas of endeavor.
Whether their objective is a superstar baseball player, a musical prodigy,
a mathematical wizard, or a scientific genius, people who selectively clone
on the basis of guaranteeing success in a specific area would understand-
ably choose a willing DNA donor whose phenotype and achievements they
consider optimal under all the circumstances. Once they secure the best
available DNA for their child's genotype, they would rear the child with
great emphasis on education, training, exposure, and experience in the
chosen field, immersing the child in the subject matter. And again, the
results will be as unpredictable (or as predictably diverse) as those obtained
by countless other well-meaning but overbearing parents throughout human
history. Certainly and inevitably, some parents will be disappointed with
the behavior and achievements of their children of cloning in these
situations, and the children will be aware of some degree of parental
disapproval. However, to suggest that this is anything new, or that it would
be immeasurably worse than it has been for children and parents from time
immemorial, is rank speculation at best.
Because human beings are not sheep, literally or figuratively (with
apologies to Dolly), free will is a vital and often unpredictable variable in
every life. Regardless of a person's genotype, he or she has the freedom to
exercise individual options across a sprawling spectrum of life choices,
year by year. Even the staunchest exponents of genetic determinism would
admit that there is something ineffable about being human, something that
surpasses genetic makeup." If the courts that will grapple with anti-
'54 See Dena S. Davis, What's Wrong With Cloning?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 83, 83-
84 (1997); Bonnie Steinbock, The NBACReport on Cloning Human Beings: What
it Did-And Did Not-Do, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 39, 42-43 (1997) (analyzing the
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
cloning legislation grasp this, they will inexorably be drawn to the
conclusion that SCNT cloning is properly analyzed as another form of
human reproduction, different from the others not in the fundamentals but
only in the details.
The extreme slippery slope horrors conjured up by some opponents of
cloning contain even less substance.'"I As pointed out earlier, cloning does
not have anything to do with mass-production of identical people. Whether
the feared outcome is an army of Adolf Hitlers, afatwa spearheaded by
thousands of Osama bin Ladens, an NBA overflowing with Michael
Jordans, or a Las Vegas showroom full of Elvis Presleys, the fears are
unfounded-the stuff of nightmares or pipe dreams." 6 Cloning cannot be
carried out in a factory arrayed with row upon row of large test tubes,
despite various depictions in popular films such as the Jurassic Park
series. 57 Every embryo would need to be individually implanted in the
uterus of a living woman, one per person, and gestated for the usual nine
months, with all the inconveniences, travails, discomfort, and pain that has
always entailed.
Plus, it is important to remember that the outcome obtained after all of
those failed attempts and after nine months of gestation is a human baby.' 8
Cloning does not "produce" a full-formed adult creature such as Franken-
stein's monster, ready off-the-shelf to wreak havoc on an unsuspecting
world. When any living creature is born through the intervention of
cloning, that creature is a human baby, needing to be constantly cared for,
fed, and changed. The personality, powers, and predilections that will be
exhibited by that baby as an adult will not be evident for many years just
as with all other human babies. 59 Thus, anyone who expects to use cloning
extent to which opponents of cloning overestimate the centrality of genetics as a
determinant of human individuality).
1' See Silver, supra note 106, at 49 (listing some of the imagined horrible
misuses of human cloning).
156 Horrific visions of armies of mass-produced, malevolent clones have long
held a special fascination for film-makers. STAR WARS EPISODE II: ATrACK OF THE
CLONES (Lucasfilm 2002), is one of the latest and most ubiquitous of these
fantasies. See generally James Warren, Hollywood and Cloning: An Old Pairing,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1997, at 5.
"' Although one memorable line from the Jurassic Park films (Universal
Studios) does seem particularly apposite to the issue of cloning: "Life will find a
way."
158 See NBAC REPORT, supra note 17, at 83 ("Should this type of cloning
proceed, however, any children born as a result of this technique should be treated
as having the same rights and moral status as any other human being.").
'5 See Silver, supra note 106, at 52-53.
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to create adults for any specific aim, whether benign or evil, would have to
be exceedingly patient and ready to work and wait for decades for the
eventual- result. Will any mad scientist or arch-villain be willing or able to
change diapers of, breast-feed, and burp the anticipated army of future
henchmen in their infancy? The most active imaginations that have
conjured up the specter of cloning as an evil plague would be hard-pressed
to visualize any sinister mastermind with the tenacity and capacity to nurse
hosts of future accomplices through all the years of changing diapers,
teething, toilet training, three o'clock a.m. nightmares, chicken pox,
tantrums, growing pains, puberty, and adolescent rebellion. Even loving
parents can sometimes scarcely imagine it.
If in vitro fertilization has not threatened the world with mass-produced
people, neither will cloning, because no aspect of either one presents the
option for assembly line procreation. If anything, cloning is less susceptible
to rapid, efficient, large-scale reproduction, owing to the daunting failure
rates that are likely to persist for many years. While we can expect the
success rate of cloning to improve with time and further technical advances,
there is no reason to presume that it will ever be as high as that associated
with coital reproduction. Thus, the Xerox objection is pure fantasy.
Once we move beyond the horror-movie level of argument, the anti-
cloning position remains equally unpersuasive.' 6 Is there a realistic
possibility that children of cloning will be enslaved, used as involuntary
organ donors, treated as commodities, or otherwise disproportionately be
abused and depersonalized? Will their caregivers consider them sub-human,
more akin to property or pets than children, and subject them to a phalanx
required to undergo physical and psychological assaults? Will families
dissolve as parents, having exercised total control over their children's
genotypes, somehow feel less emotional attachment to them-feeling no
more bond to them than to their cars or sweaters or any other manufactured
product? Will the clone-specific abuses spread to such a pervasive extent
that the courts will deem it preferable that cloning never take place at all?
To suggest that any of these postulated evils are apt to become more
than theoretical threats is to underestimate the humanity of the people who
,60 Some notable opponents of cloning have gone so far as to imply that,
irrespective of actual evidence, cloning is wrong because it feels wrong to us. See
LEON R. KASS & JAMES Q. WILSON, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING 19 (1998)
("We are repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings not because of the
strangeness or novelty of the undertaking, but because we intuit and feel,
immediately and without argument, the violation of things that we rightfully hold
dear."). This, of course, is more properly categorized as bias, baseless fear,
unarticulated emotion, or religious sentiment than law or logic.
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would clone and to overestimate the centrality that knowledge of a clonal
origin would occupy in the hearts and minds of the people involved. It also
assumes away the force of the rule of law.
There is no question that children born through cloning would be
entitled to every legal protection applicable to all other children. There is
absolutely no danger that these children would somehow be exempted from
the laws prohibiting child abuse, mandating proper care and support of
children, requiring the education of children, outlawing the nonconsensual
harvesting of organs, and banning child labor or involuntary servitude.
These laws would be fully applicable, and would stand as a deterrent to
would-be violators with the same efficacy as in all other circumstances. No
legislator, let alone a majority of legislators in any jurisdiction, would take
the position that any of these laws should be amended to deprive coverage
to children of cloning. There would be no civilized public policy rationale
for doing so, and the manifest injustice of such action would render it
political suicide for anyone who attempted it. Once the naked clone is born,
he or she would be clothed with every one of the legal rights-from
constitutional guarantees to statutory protections-that cover all ofus. The
feared violation of these existing, indisputably applicable legal saieguards
is a poor argument in favor of denying the naked clone the opportunity to
live.
Given the complete array of legal strictures, would caregivers
nonetheless single out the children of cloning for poor treatment, withheld
affection, and depersonalizing abuse? Again, our immersion in popular
entertainments has inured us to the suggestion that people, on average, are
simply awaiting an opportunity to visit horrors on the children in their
homes. In the world outside Hollywood, there are no barbaric hordes eager
to use cloning to provide them with helpless subjects for their wretched
experiments and abuses. On the contrary, there are multitudes who yearn
for an opportunity to nurture a child in their lives.
Irrespective of the primary reason why any particular individual or
couple might want to have a child through cloning, the opportunity to
nurture a child is likely among the many reasons why people have always
wanted children. These reasons are varied, complex, and overlapping, and
may shift over time. What remains constant is that the desire to have
children is one of the most deeply rooted, powerful, and profound of all
human aspirations.
1 6'
The following is a partial list of possible reasons people might want to
have children. The list appears in no particular sequence: (1) Perpetuate
161 See Silver, supra note 106, at 53.
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one's personal or family name, traditions, preferences, and/or business; (2)
transmit some of one's genes to the next generation to achieve a modicum
of physical immortality; (3) provide a source and an object of companion-
ship and love; (4) supply a source of care, love, companionship, and
security in the last years of life; (5) provide a person whom one can love,
nurture, and help long-term; (6) comply with religious, familial, and/or
societal expectations; (7) provide a deeper source of meaning in life, a
reason for being; (8) secure a beneficiary of and heir to one's lifetime
accumulation of savings and other material goods, both during life and
upon death; (9) satisfy the desire to enjoy a child-inclUsive life, featuring
caring, play, teaching, and shared exploration of the wonders of existence;
(10) relive treasured memories from one's own childhood; (11) rectify
perceived deficiencies and missed opportunities from one's own childhood;
(12) vicariously experience aspects of life, including career decisions and
making certain choices among life's options, one regrets never experienc-
ing firsthand; (13) altruistically devote oneself to a cause greater than self;
(14) create more connections with relatives and other people; (15) make an
impact on the future that will live beyond one's own life, perhaps by
rearing one's children to enter specific professions or excel in specific
fields; (16) secure an heir apparent to an actual or perceived throne or
position of power and privilege, whether in government or in business; and
(17) obtain an in-family source of help with the family's farm or other
business.
Most people, of course, do not approach the decision to have children
with a checklist in hand. Even the archetypal rational utility maximizer
would be far more likely to tackle the procreation question with heart, not
spreadsheet. The reasons for having children are so numerous and so basic
to the human condition-indeed, to all sentient life--that they generally do
not require articulation. They are understood on a subconscious level and
are deeply felt. But to the extent it is possible to parse these reasons
rationally and methodically, let us consider how -the decision to clone
compares to other decisions to have children.
Whatever the mode of reproduction, people will differ as to which
reasons are most important and which are secondary or even entirely
absent. This is true without factoring in the cloning option. For example,
reason number two (transmit some of one's genes to the next generation to
achieve a modicum of physical immortality) is extremely powerful for
some people, and moves them to endure great exertions and tremendous
personal expense in the pursuit of in vitro fertilization or surrogacy while
eschewing the adoption option. Since the beginnings of civilization, it has
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been paramount for some parents to rear a child who will live, work, and
act in a certain predetermined manner, whether to carry on the family
business, avenge some wrong, or achieve ambitions left unrealized in the
parents' lives. Such people have always treated, educated, pressured, and
trained their children to fit within their template with mixed results--some
successes and some unfortunate consequences for both parent and child. So
reasons one (perpetuate family name, etc.), twelve (vicariously experience
life), and fifteen (impact the future) are not new, and are not unique to
would-be cloners. Moreover, although some of the reasons on the list may
be considered utilitarian, even manipulative or exploitative, one hopes that
it is a rarity where one chooses to have children, does have children, and
rears those children, solely for selfish, calculated, personal profit. Love and
affection, and the other altruistic or mutually supportive reasons would
usually accompany the utilitarian approach if not dominate it.
It appears that every one of the listed reasons for having children
applies with at least equal force to cloning as to other alternatives. None of
the reasons would fail to apply to cloning, and some might apply even more
strongly than usual. But, as with other ways of having children, people
interested in cloning would typically have a complex and evolving
amalgam of motivations. Certainly love would be the predominant
motivator in the naked clone scenario and its variants, just as it usually is
in other forms of reproduction. 6 In fact, love may be more universally the
prime factor in cloning than in traditional procreation, for the simple reason
that it is not possible to clone unintentionally, whereas it is possible to
become pregnant despite a desire to the contrary, through failure of
contraceptives, irresponsible unprotected sex, or rape.'63 We can rest
assured that people would not endure the expense and effort of cloning
i61 See John A. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 609, 624 (1999) (arguing that, at least with the benefit of appropriate
counseling, people who raise a child of cloning will probably be competent and
loving parents committed to their child's best interests and unique identity).
63 See James Q. Wilson, Sex and Family, in KASS & WILSON, supra note 160,
at 89, 94 (likening cloning to in vitro fertilization ("IVF"), where there is no
evidence that IVF had a harmful effect on the children's mental or psychological
status or their relationships with parents); Segal, supra note 146, at 61-62 (stating
that children conceived through assisted reproduction "did not differ from naturally
conceived children in emotions, behavior, or quality of family relations" and
indicating that adoptive parents and those conceiving children through assisted
reproduction "expressed greater warmth and emotional involvement with children,
as well as greater satisfaction with parenting roles, relative to birth parents.").
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unless they truly wanted to have a child. There would be no surprise,
accidental, or otherwise unwanted children of cloning."
Thus, the factors that spur people to clone would be very similar to the
traditional reasons for wanting children, and might differ from case to case
only to the same degree that motivations have always differed among those
who wish to adopt, versus procreate through coital reproduction, versus the
use of assisted reproduction, including in vitro fertilization and
surrogacy.'65 The means of reproduction are varied, but the ultimate goals
are harmonious if not utterly indistinguishable.
These factors also constitute a formidable moral/normative reason why
cloning should not be legally segregated from all other forms of human
reproduction and subjected to sweeping bans. The naked clone scenario and
its variants present us with people, whether married or single, heterosexual
or homosexual, who want to have children with some biological tie to them,
and want to nurture these children. Presumably many of these people would
be unable to have their own biological children through any other means,
because of infertility of one or both members of the couple, lack of a
partner, presence of serious genetic problems within one or both members,
absence of an opposite-sex partner, or other circumstances. Yet they would
have all of the reasons any traditional procreative couple has for wanting
children, and an equal commitment to and capability of nurturing their
children to maturity and independence. Why, then, should they be denied?
Morally, they should be afforded the opportunity to have, and care for, their
own biologically related children by the only means left available to them
by the vagaries of life.
There are one or two additional reasons for cloning not on the general
list. As mentioned, some might want to clone themselves to secure a
potential source of compatible, non-essential organs, blood, and other
bodily components. Even if this were the primary motivator in some cases,
as where the DNA donor is afflicted with a serious medical condition, it is
probable that additional motivators would soon begin to evolve and even
overwhelm the original utilitarian impetus. After all, an infant child of
cloning is still a baby, and would presumably be equally as appealing and
endearing to adults as babies have always been. Adults seem to be
16 See Sarah S. Brown & Leon Eisenberg, Unintended Pregnancy and the Well-
Being of Children and Families, 274 JAMA 1332, 1332 (1995) (noting that nearly
sixty percent of the pregnancies in the United States are unintended at the time of
conception, whether because they occur at a suboptimal time or are entirely
unwanted).
165 See Katz, supra note 10, at 23-27 (discussing the argument in favor of
cloning as a form of reproduction).
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instinctively drawn to infants and driven to care for them and nurture them.
As adult and child share experiences over time, it is virtually inevitable that
mutual love and genuine bonding would supplement or replace other
motivations. Likewise, a desire to replicate as exactly as possible oneself,
a lost loved one, or an admired third party would be apt to give way to love,
as reality interferes with the theory that led to the cloning decision.'
66
Might the cloning situation constitute an especially extreme or
potentially abusive strain of some of the motivators, such as reasons one,
twelve, and fifteen? This is unlikely. People have traditionally seemed to
believe their children were the veritable reincarnation of themselves, even
when another person contributed half of the DNA. Cloners could scarcely
be more zealous in their efforts to ensure that their children adhere to the
desired path in life than some parents have always been in seeking to direct
their progeny's lives. That does not mean it is right for parents to treat their
children this way, only that the human race has a long history of both
success and failure, triumph and tragedy, along these lines. Again, in most
cases, love is more powerful and enduring than ego, ambition, or any other
selfish motivator. In short, cloning is properly viewed as one more
alternative in the choice to reproduce, akin to all the others in its array of
advantages and disadvantages. It is a form of human reproduction, not
mechanical replication or the malevolent plaything of mad scientists, and
should be recognized as such by the law.
Those who, Cassandra-like, foresee calamitous and ruinous abuses of
the new powers made possible by cloning have forgotten that technology
is both created by and ruled by people-people with common decency and
common sense. Fears of cloning becoming rampant and seriously diminish-
ing genetic diversity, undermining familial love, or spawning a recrudes-
cence of slavery, are of a type that is not new. It was not long ago that the
birth control pill was a novel and powerful scientific advancement, with the
power to bring human reproduction to a halt. The widespread availability
of birth control pills could have brought to pass the extinction of the human
race in one generation.., in theory. But that theory would have required
a world in which people abandoned their core instincts to have children and
subverted their highest impulses to the mindless service of a technological
tool. That world exists only on paper, on film, and in the imagination.
Decades after the advent of the birth control pill, procreation has not ended,
'66 See James Q. Wilson, The Paradox of Cloning, in KASS & WiLSON, supra
note 160, at 64-65 ("Parents, whether they acquire a child by normal birth, artificial
insemination, or adoption, will, in the overwhelming majority of cases, become
deeply attached to the infant and care for it without regard to its origin.").
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and the fact that you are here to read these words is evidence on behalf of
the real world.
Of course, it is possible that some courts, including the Supreme Court,
will be sufficiently determined in their personal opposition to the cloning
of humans that they will find a way to distinguish cloning from other forms
of reproduction. Particularly powerful religion-based or morality-rooted
aversion could move judges and justices to construct a legal and policy
justification for upholding anti-cloning laws. Arguably, such factors moved
the Court narrowly to define the issues in post-Roe controversial cases
involving sodomy and assisted suicide, and to rule in a manner inconsistent
with the broader principles evident in the jurisprudence.6 7 Uncritical
acceptance of, some of the more horrific, worst-case, slippery-slope
scenarios, coupled with personal religious and moral beliefs, might lead
judges to uphold the bans. But adherence to stare decisis and the rule of law
should generate a line ofjudicial decisions in which bans on the cloning of
humans are consistently struck down.
Would it be legally significant that some people might want to clone
for reasons some judges find repugnant? For example, consider situations
different from the naked clone scenario, but not so extreme as to run afoul
of existing laws against murder or child abuse. Perhaps the most intense
egocentric motivations for cloning would offend judges as megalomaniacal
self-glorification and the apotheosis of self. A yearning for personal fame
and/or physical immortality would be far less sympathetic to many jurists
than the desire of couples and individuals to use cloning as a form of
assisted reproduction for more traditional reasons for family building. But
absent manifestations that cross preexisting and well-established legal
lines, such as cloning for involuntary harvesting of organs, slavery, or
sexual abuse, the law should not intervene to prevent people from using
cloning for reasons judges personally consider improper. 6'
The courts generally have not seen fit to interject themselves into
reproductive decision-making, so as to substitute their judgment for that of
would-be parents in deciding whether to have a child. The few exceptions,
167 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (narrowly framing the
core issue as "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy" rather than as a fundamental privacy right);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (narrowly framing the issue
as "whether the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a
right to commit suicide," not as a fundamental right to privacy). See also Lawton,
supra note 12, at 333-34.
168 See Katz, supra note 10, at 31-35.
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of questionable validity in their own right, are limited to extreme cases such
as compulsory sterilization of mentally challenged persons, 69 and prisoners
denied conjugal visits or the use of artificial insemination with their
spouses. 70 There is certainly no justification for expanding these dubious
doctrines to ban cloning. 7' The reasons why people desire to have children,
as listed previously,' include some that offend the personal morals of
certain people. We may think it is morally wrong for someone to want a
child mainly to carry on the family business, or to provide a way for the
parent to live again vicariously through the child, or to take care of the
parent during enfeebled old age. But would-be cloners did not invent, and
have no monopoly on, such unappealing motivations; others beat them to
the punch by several tens of thousands of years. People have chosen to have
children for these and other arguably ignoble reasons since the dawn of
humanity. Yet the law does not empower the government to forbid its
citizens to reproduce on this basis. Government cannot ask couples or
individuals to explain and justify the reasons why they want to repro-
duce--whether through cloning or any other means. As the time-hallowed
saying goes, it is none of their business.
This result may dismay some; however, decades of Supreme Court
holdings have left little doctrinal daylight between cloning and other facets
of the reproduction, abortion, contraception, and privacy construct.
C. Galileo in Modern Chains and the Right to Research
When the facts diverge from the naked clone situation, somewhat
different legal issues become relevant. For example, some of the more
169 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). See Paul A. Lombardo, Three
Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30
(1985) (debunking the factual underpinnings of the case).
170 See Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that an
inmate's status as a prisoner was sufficient to justify the prison's policy of
prohibiting the inmate from artificially inseminating his wife); Anderson v.
Vasquez, 827 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that an inmate on death row
lacked the right to conjugal visits and was not entitled to compel the prison to
furnish him with artificial insemination services), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 28
F.3d 104 (9th Cir. 1994).
171 See generally Kristin M. Davis, Note, Inmates and Artificial Insemination:
A New Perspective on Prisoners' Residual Right to Procreate, 44 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 163 (1993); Jacqueline B. DeOliveira, Comment, Marriage,
Procreation and the Prisoner: Should Reproductive Alternatives Survive During
Incarceration?, 5 TOURO L. REv. 189 (1988).
12 See infra pp. 42-43.
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sweeping bans include prohibitions on the cloning of humans for any
purposes, including scientific or medical research. Some researchers may
want to use cloned humans, presumably limited to early stages of embry-
onic development, to explore stem cell options and other issues.' Such
experiments would in no event lead to the birth of a living infant and, as
such, would fall within a different category from the several variants of the
naked clone scenario. Presumably there would be no implantation in any
woman's uterus and no implication of a woman's privacy rights. There
would be no issues of parental rights, nor of reproductive liberty.
However, these cases would implicate important rights too. 17 4 It can be
argued that scientific or medical research constitutes a form of expression
within the meaning of the First Amendment.' The research process
involves a quest for truth, a hunt for more information, which is at the heart
of the First Amendment, as an indispensable prerequisite to the more
familiar dissemination of information.'76 Also, perhaps the performance of
research itself could be viewed as a type of expressive conduct or symbolic
speech, making the statement that such research is valuable and the
furtherance of knowledge concerning a hypothesis is a worthy aim. 77
If one accepts either of these premises, a total ban on one particular
form of research, i.e., that involving the cloning of humans, should be
173 Goldman, supra note 90, at 109-11 (discussing various medical-scientific
advantages of cloning for research purposes).
74 See Paul Berg & Maxine Singer, Regulating Human Cloning, 282 SCIENCE
413,413 (1998) (asserting that legislation is a suboptimal means for the regulation
of scientific inquiry and progress). For an interesting compendium of short essays
articulating various legal and policy-based arguments against bans on scientific
inquiry into the cloning of humans, see Reason Online, Criminalizing Science, at
http://reason.com/bioresearch/bioresearch.shtml (Nov. 2001).
'
7 1 See Matthew B. Hsu, Note, Banning Human Cloning: An Acceptable Limit
on Scientific Inquiry or an Unconstitutional Restriction of Symbolic Speech?, 87
GEO. L.J. 2399, 2410-16 (1999).
'
76 See John A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional
Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1217-18 (1977) (asserting that the scientific
method depends on experimentation as an essential prelude to the dissemination of
scientific ideas).
'7" See generally STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN
AMERICA 7-9 (1994); Gary L. Francione, Experimentation and the Marketplace
Theory of the FirstAmendment, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 417,431-58 (1987) (evaluating
the various ways in which the experiment is itself a form of expressive conduct);
Roy G. Spece, Jr. & Jennifer Weinzierl, First Amendment Protection of Experi-
mentation: A Critical Review and Tentative Synthesis/Reconstruction of the
Literature, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 185 (1998).
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considered a content-based restriction on expression, invoking strict
scrutiny by the courts. The ban would be explicitly aimed at one specific
type of research, not neutrally applicable to scientific research in general,
and it would be deliberately and precisely targeted against human clonal
experimentation. The gathering and dissemination of scientific data specific
to the cloning of humans would be the entire focal point, tantamount to an
explicit ban on expressive conduct that proclaims the worthiness of
pursuing human clonal research. This is content-based regulation of
expression, and it calls for strict scrutiny. A compelling state interest is
required in order to survive strict scrutiny and, as we have discussed, it
could be difficult to cobble together such an interest in banning cloning,
given its similarities to other forms of reproduction and the implausibility
of the worst-case arguments. Moreover, it is a bedrock pillar of the First
Amendment that government may not ban or punish speech, including
expressive conduct, based on its content merely because that content is
deemed repugnant, unpopular, or inadvisable. 7 '
The right or liberty to conduct scientific research--to search for
knowledge and truth-has some support in Supreme Court precedent. In
several cases, the Court has stated that the First Amendment safeguards a
"marketplace of ideas," and, as with any marketplace, it must be continu-
ally stocked with new supplies, whether obtained by the press or by
scientific researchers.'79 The actions of those who produce information and
ideas for the marketplace of ideas are deserving of First Amendment
protection, at least as much as the actions of those who disseminate
information and ideas.' Before ideas and information can be expressed,
178 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (striking down Texas
legislation penalizing those-who bum the American flag to express an anti-
American viewpoint). See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 391
(1992) (invalidating a hate-speech law as a content-based restriction).
179 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972) (likening the infor-
mation production function of the news-gathering press to that of researchers);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (finding FirstAmendment protection for the
financing of political speech). See also IRA H. CARMEN, CLONING AND THE
CoNsTIUTIoN 35-36 (1985); Ira H. Carmen, Should. Human Cloning Be
Criminalized?, 13 J.L. & POL. 745, 752 (1997) (arguing that cloning research and
other scientific inquiry implicates protected First Amendment values); June
Coleman, Comment, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A Constitutional Analysis
of State Laws BanningEmbryological Procedures, 27 PAC. L.J. 1331, 1387(1996)
(maintaining that "[v]arious Supreme Court decisions, [when]'read together, seem
to acknowledge a freedom to conduct research which is anchored in the freedom
of speech').
180 See Francione, supra note 177, at 428-29 (discussing the recognition by the
framers of the Constitution of the "sacred" nature of scientific inquiry).
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they necessarily must first be created or discovered by someone. The Court
has recognized, in dicta, a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in
conducting research or inquiry as well,"8' although some lower federal
courts have held that there is no fundamental right to conduct research on
human fetuses. 2 Substantive and procedural due process requirements
have also been postulated as sources of, constitutional protection for
scientific inquiry."'
Modem events seldom recall the official condemnation and persecution
suffered by the renowned seventeenth-century scientist Galileo Galilei, but
the bans on research and exploration into cloning have done just that. The
Inquisition forced Galileo publicly to deny, under threat of torture, what he
had learned through scientific study-that the earth revolved around the sun,
i.e., the Copernican theory--in order to escape execution for the crime of
heresy. Found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, he spent the last
ten years of his life under house arrest."' This infamous travesty was made
possible by a society in which the line between Church and State was
blatantly breached and a person could be criminally punished for activities
that discomforted the religious sensibilities of the dominant elite. When
those in power use that authority in a preemptive strike to seal off entire
categories of learning and inquiry, the loss is unfathomable. No one can
ever know what might have been known had the freedom to discover not
been denied. Second and third generations of valuable breakthroughs into
tangentially related areas might have been gained but for the prior restraint
on research, and again, we can never know what we might have learned.
This is a loss without limits.
181See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923) (noting that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees, as part of the right to liberty, the freedom "to acquire
useful knowledge... and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").
"8 2 See Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'dsub nom.
Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.
Supp. 181, 220-21 (E.D. La. 1980). See also NBAC REPORT, supra note 17, at 6
(stating that the freedom of scientific inquiry is not an absolute right and scientists
are expected to conduct their research according to widely held ethical principles,
with limits on scientific freedom acceptable at times).
183 See Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Galileo, and Government:
Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REv. 349,
394-99 (1978).
. See generally ALBERT DI CANzIo, GALILEO: His SCIENCE AND HIS SIGNIFI-
CANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MAN (1996); JEROME J. LANGFORD, GALILEO, SCIENCE
AND THE CHURCH (1998).
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When the law places Galileo in chains, the entire society of humankind
is likewise shackled. We are forced, like Galileo, to kneel before the power
of the state and abjure the reality we have found through so many years of
work and sacrifice, pretending instead that modem discoveries were never
made. We artificially and arbitrarily close the collective mind of the people
to the facts, because myths are safer and more familiar to those in command
of the coercive force of government. It would require a compelling state
interest indeed to justify such a breathtaking curtailment of the freedom of
inquiry.
Attempts to find this elusive state interest have led some to liken
cloning research to the vilest, most extreme, pseudo-scientific examples
available in the bottom of the dustbin of history, such as the notorious
experiments by Josef Mengele on living prisoners in Nazi concentration
camps. '" There are such vast differences between the two situations that
one scarcely knows where to begin. Legitimate experiments and laboratory
procedures involving very early stage human cells are legally and morally
indistinguishable from other contemporary activities that are free from
governmental censorship. This is not a case of compelling already-born,
sentient human beings to diabolical, excruciating, and ultimately fatal
surgical procedures to satisfy the perverse curiosity of an evil doctor. There
is no legal basis for placing modem cloning research either into an
unprotected class by itself, or into a locked room with Mengele as the only
cellmate.
Some would nonetheless assert that there is a compelling state interest
in preventing the creation and use of living human embryos for the explicit
purpose of serving as the raw materials for laboratory experiments. In this
view, such cloned embryos might be deemed human beings, and the clinical
exploitation and commodification of them an evil well within the power of
government to ban. Notwithstanding the potential benefits that might be
reaped from these experiments,"8 6 the sacredness of human life would stand
185 See generally LUCETrE MATALON LAGNADO & SHEILA COHN DEKEL,
CHILDREN OF THE FLAMES: DR. JOSEF MENGELE AND THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
TWINS OF AUSCHWITZ (1991). Mengele performed forcible, brutal experiments on
the prisoners of the Auschwitz death camp, including some 3000 identical twins,
very few of whom survived his horrific operations. Id.
186 See Jerome P. Kassirer & Nadia A. Rosenthal, Should Human Cloning
Research Be Off Limits?, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 905, 905 (1998) (arguing that
research on SCNT could produce many important benefits, including valuable
information on the mechanism of aging, the cause of cancer, and improved
treatments of such diseases as diabetes mellitus, leukemia, and genetic disorders).
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as an insurmountable obstacle to using cloned human embryos for medical
or scientific research.
A related point deals with the large numbers of failures likely to be
endured en route to every successful cloning. This concern applies not only
to laboratory research but also to the naked clone scenario in which parents
seek to create a live baby. Recall the dismal success rate experienced
during the process that resulted in Dolly. Until and unless massive progress
is made toward improving the lopsided ratio of failures to successes, it is
possible that every live child of cloning would be outnumbered many times
over by embryos that never make it to a live birth, never survive the earliest
stages of infancy, or are deformed. If cloning produces dozens or even
hundreds of doomed, damaged, or discarded embryos and infants for every
healthy baby, this could spark intense opposition on the grounds that this
is an appalling waste of nascent human life. Again, it appears to reduce
people to commodities and to accept many dead embryos and deformed
babies as just another of the costs of doing business for the production of
every viable, normal child of cloning.
There is a certain visceral power to these objections. If the cloning
dilemma had developed prior to Roe v. Wade,'87 there is little doubt that the
opponents of cloning would have prevailed in the courts, including the
Supreme Court. There was a long history of legal recognition and
protection of unborn human life under the common law.'88 Modem criminal
law and tort law also accommodated the interests of the state in the
protection of pre-birth humans.'89 But the lens through which the judiciary
views inchoate human life has been radically altered since Roe. The courts
* have accepted, and indeed ensured, the legality of millions of abortions
annually, with myriad embryos and fetuses intentionally eliminated at all
stages of gestation, under all circumstances, and for any and all reasons. 9 °
The process of in vitro fertilization is also now well-established 9' and is
afforded the full compliment of legal protections, notwithstanding the
'17 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"'88 See Forsythe, supra note 81, at 485-94.
189 Id. at 494-513.
190 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
See also cases cited infra notes 207-10.
'9' In vitro fertilization has become commonplace, despite the onerous expenses
and inefficiencies involved. See Lawton, supra note 12, at 328 (indicating it may
cost from $40,000 to $200,000 to have a child using IVF technology); ROBERTSON,
supra note 139, at 100, 116 (mentioning that thousands of IVF attempts are
performed every year, and some states require health insurers to cover IVF).
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significant numbers of unsuccessful attempts to bring about a healthy baby
and the frequency with which embryos are discarded.'
There has not been a surfeit of restrictive legislation or regulation
pertaining to in vitro fertilization,'93 despite some moral and religious
objections.'94 No state has banned it,' 9 and the legal measures that are in
effect generally require only data collection, certification of practitioners
and facilities, and the provision for informed consent. 96 The parallels with
cloning are both obvious and significant.'97 Some critics initially predicted
that in vitro fertilization would result in the mass-production of infants.'98
Public outrage at the dawn of in vitro fertilization was extreme, at least in
some quarters, and dire consequences were prophesied.' 99 In the early
years, legal commentators decried the technology and urged restrictions.2"'
Yet, as the reality juggernaut inexorably encroached on speculation, the law
has actually moved to protect and foster the use of in vitro fertilization,
primarily because it has been demonstrably successful and a boon to
infertile couples and individuals.2"'
Realistically, it is highly unlikely that the cloning of humans would be
attempted by most medical professionals, nor would people want to try it
192 See Laurence H. Tribe, Second Thoughts on Cloning, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
1997, at A31 (maintaining that the scientific community regards cloning as an
"incremental step beyond what we are already doing with artificial insemination,
in vitro fertilization, fertility enhancing drugs and genetic manipulation").
193 See JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND
REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 62 (1997); Roger J. Chin, Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technologies: Legal Issues in Procreation, 8 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 190,
197 (1996).
194 See Roberto Suro, Vatican Asks Governments to Curb Birth Technology and
to Outlaw Surrogates: Transfer of Embryos and Artificial Fertilization Largely
Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1987, at Al.
'9' See Note, supra note 86, at 2361.
'9 See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or
Paper Tiger?, 34 HoUS. L. REv. 609, 641-51 (1997).
197 See Katz, supra note 10, at 14 (concluding that cloning is not as revolution-
ary as feared and is arguably "more deserving of protection as a means of
reproduction than many other techniques").
'98 See A Rush of Test-Tube Babies Ahead?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
7, 1978, at 22.
199 See Wu, supra note 127, at 1512-13 (citing sources denouncing IVF as
"startling as the atomic bomb").
200 See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS
OF PARENTING 212 (1993); Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation
Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARv. L. REv. 669, 669-70 (1985).
201 See DOLGIN, supra note 193, at 9; Chin, supra note 193, at 194-99.
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as a form of assisted reproduction, until the technology has moved beyond
the stage of high failure rates and abnormal births, with or without
legislation restricting the practice. It would be prohibitively expensive and
ethically dubious to persist in efforts to clone people unless additional
experiments involving animals, especially higher primates, dramatically
improved the probability of a normal, live birth. On the pragmatic level,
cloning would need to attain something approaching the success rate of in
vitro fertilization before it becomes a real option, both for would-be parents
and for the medical and technological professionals involved. The process
would be self-regulating to a significant degree. If legislation were
narrowly tailored to regulate human reproductive cloning and/or research,
perhaps with a very short-term temporary ban until the requisite progress
is achieved through non-human research, there could be a legitimate
judicial imprimatur as well.
Potentially, courts might draw a distinction between "casualties"
unavoidably incurred in the process of cloning a human being under the
naked clone situation and cloned embryos intentionally created and
"harvested" for the express purpose of scientific/medical research. The
naked clone position is buttressed by powerful additional constitutional
rights not available in the research setting, and this might justify greater
judicial deference to the former than the latter. Restrictions and regula-
tions, although probably not an outright permanent ban, could be tolerated
in the research setting, while cloning for reproduction would be much
more fully protected. However, in light of the analogous collateral loss of
human embryos during in vitro fertilization experiments and actual in
vitro fertilization attempts to reproduce and the many millions of pre-
natal fetuses and embryos deliberately destroyed through various forms
of abortion," 2 it is possible that courts would not find an outcome-
determinative distinction between the two. We have blazed a path that
may lead to even large-scale, intentional sacrifice of research-only cloned
human embryos, and a fortiori the unintentional loss of embryos asso-
ciated with the presumed low success rate of live-birth directed cloning
efforts.
202 The Centers for Disease Control statistics indicate that the number of legal
abortions performed annually in the United States was consistently well above one
million per year from 1980 through 1997. See Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Abortion Rates Decline (Jan. 7, 2000), at http://www.infoplease.com/
ipa/A0764203.html. For example, in 1996, there were an estimated 1.3 million
induced abortions in this country. See National Center for Health Statistics, U.S.
Pregnancy Rate Lowest in Two Decades, Dec. 15, 1999, at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/releases/99facts/pregrate.hn.
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D. The Role of Love in Tying Together the Doctrinal Strands
The Article returns to reproductive cloning and leaves aside the
somewhat less robust, but still formidable, case in favor of some level of
constitutional protection for clonal research involving humans. Even if only
one viable infant is produced from 277 enucleated eggs, as in the case of
Dolly," 3 there is no principled legal reason under the established jurispru-
dence to use a low success rate to uphold a permanent and total ban on the
cloning of humans. Short-term regulation and limitation linked to success
rate, not blanket and unending prohibition, is the most that the courts
should uphold.2" The same is true regarding the prospect that cloning of
humans, at least until the process is improved, may cause significant
numbers of babies to be born with grotesque deformities, gigantism, and a
very short lifespan. We crossed, and burned, that bridge long ago. It is
proper and constitutionally defensible for Congress to enact legislation that
places health and safety restrictions on cloning, perhaps even a temporary,
self-expiring moratorium, pending evidence of sufficient scientific and
technological progress. But the debate thus far has been dominated less by
203 In later SCNT experiments involving mice, the results have been somewhat
better, although still not approaching a high success rate. One experiment resulted
in ten mice surviving from 800 embryos transferred, and.a subsequent trial yielded
five mice surviving from 298 embryos. See T. Wakayama et al., Full-term
Development of Mice From Enucleated Qocytes Injected with Cumulus Cell
Nuclei, 394 NATURE 369, 371 (1998). Even more encouraging, recent work
involving cows has found that cloned cows are as healthy as their conventionally-
bred counterparts, and researchers have claimed an eighty percent success rate
among those cows that survived gestation, although many embryos were
spontaneously aborted during gestation. See Whitfield, supra note 24; Robert P.
Lanza et al., Cloned Cattle Can Be Healthy and Normal, 294 SCIENCE 1893-94
(2001). With the successful cloning of a calico cat named "CC" (for "Copy Cat")
by a Texas company named Genetic Savings and Clone in late 2001, the number
of mammalian species cloned through SCNT reached six: sheep, mice, cattle, goats,
pigs, and cats. It is interesting to note that "CC" did not have the same physical
appearance as the DNA donor cat, because of post-fertilization factors that
contribute to phenotypic expression. Rick Weiss, Copy Cat is First Cloned Pet,
WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2002, at Al.
There is reason to believe that "improvements in animal cloning indicate that
safety concerns may be only a temporary barrier to reproductive [use of cloning]
in humans." See Ethics Committee Report of the American Society for Reproduc-
tive Medicine, Human Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (Cloning), 74 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 873 (2000).
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such legitimate short-term concerns than by unending, unfounded prejudice
and ignorance.
The same penumbras and emanations that have been divined by the
Supreme Court in the context of abortion rights must also embrace the
naked clone. Indeed, there is a stronger public policy rationale buttressing
the naked clone situation, in that its aim is the propagation of human life.
As crucially important as a person's privacy rights and personal autonomy
are, the naked clone scenario presents an even more satisfying final
outcome: a loved and wanted living child, rather than an aborted fetus or
embryo. While abortion rights safeguard a woman's right not to reproduce,
the naked clone represents a woman's (and man's) right to reproduce. The
jurisprudence that recognized the former must necessarily and at least as
vigorously support the latter.2" 5
It is not the strength of the doctrinal foundation underlying the abortion
decisions that guarantees the naked clone rights, but its fragility. The Court,
often by the narrowest of majorities, has been unwilling to concede the
existence of several rather minor and specialized limitations on abortion
rights because of concern that the exceptions would expose the brittle
doctrinal and historical support" 6 for abortion rights in general and
undermine the entire structure. The same premonitions that led the Court
to invalidate laws requiring parental consent for abortions sought by their
unemancipated minor children, 07 providing that second-trimester abortions
205 See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376-77 (N.D. I11.), aff'dmem.,
914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990). The case involved an infertile couple's efforts to
avail themselves of medically-assisted reproduction, including the use of a donated
embryo and in vitro fertilization. The district court held that an Illinois law banning
embryo and fetal research and prohibiting embryo donation, embryo freezing, and
experimental prenatal diagnostic procedures was impermissibly vague and an
unacceptable infringement on a woman's fundamental right to privacy. The court
stated, "It takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of constitution-
ally protected choices that includes the right to have access to contraceptives, there
must be included within that cluster the right to submit to a medical procedure that
may bring about, rather than prevent, pregnancy." Id. See also Lindley v. Sullivan,
889 F.2d 124, 130 (7th Cir. 1989) (opining that there is a fundamental interest in
having children, citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and other cases);
Cameron v. Bd. of Educ., 795 F. Supp. 228, 236-37 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (citing
Eisenstadt and Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), in support
of a holding that a single woman has a fundamental "constitutional privacy right
to ... become pregnant by artificial insemination").
2 See David Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade,
45 Mo. L. REv. 639, 652-53 (1980).
207 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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take place only in hospitals," 8 mandating parental notification that their
unemancipated minor children are seeking an abortion,0 9 or restricting
partial-birth abortions,21 would drive the Court to.strike down legislation
banning the cloning of humans in the naked clone situation. Any judicial
approval of a legitimate, even compelling governmental interest in
preventing the destructionand exploitation of inchoate human life in the
cloning context readily could be turned against abortion rights in the next
case.
Although some commentators have argued that abortion rights are in
a class by themselves, with similar legal support unavailable to cloning, this
is unpersuasive. While it is true that some cases contain language identify-
ing abortion as distinct from some other issues,21' this is an artifact of the
subtext that acknowledges the fundamental weakness of the constitutional
underpinnings of the abortion rights.' The line of abortion cases does not
stand for the principle that the practice of abortion is inherently noble or
good. On the contrary, the abortion jurisprudence rests on the more
foundational precept that a woman has the right to make her own decisions
as to whether to reproduce or to carry to term a fetus within her body, not
that the law must favor abortion over birth. The inventive and highly
controversial judicial reasoning that led to the creation of abortion rights
... Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
209 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
210 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
211 Abortion has been described as "inherently different from marital intimacy,
or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or
education, with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, and
Pierce and Meyer were respectively concerned." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159
(1973). It also has been described as "a unique act." Planned Parenthood of S.E.
Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). These statements are literally true, but
can hardly support a suggestion that abortion is a right exalted above all others or
utterly beyond comparison.
212 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 833. The four dissenting justices argued
that "Roe was wrongly decided" and "should be overruled." Id. at 844. Chief
Justice Rehnquist declared that the decision to abort is "different in kind" from
other recognized privacy rights such as those involving contraception and
procreation because abortion "necessarily involves the destruction of a fetus." Id.
at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted). Justice Scalia's opinion asseverated that "the best the Court can do to
explain how it is that the word 'liberty' must be thought to include the right to
destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate
a value judgment and conceal a political choice." Id. at 983 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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and the invalidation of dozens of anti-abortion statutes in the states has
survived intense legal and political criticism from the outset, not because
abortion is a palpable- public or private virtue, but because it implicates
other virtues that are central to human rights. Those virtues-the liberty of
free, autonomous individuals to decide whether to have children, the
privacy rights that prevent the government from restricting or dictating
reproductive options, the personal autonomy and dominion over procreative
processes taking place within a woman's own body--are abundantly
manifested in the case of cloning, at least as much as within the abortion
context."'
The creation and exploitation of human clone embryos. solely for
research purposes is a closer case, but here, too, modem jurisprudence
favors only limited regulation, not an outright ban. A blanket and total
prohibition such as set forth in the HCPA is probably violative of First
Amendment rights. It would be more appropriate to regulate cloning-related
research in a manner consistent with other federal restrictions on biomedi-
cal research involving human subjects. Requirements for researchers to
submit proposals to expert panels prior to conducting studies, with federal
guidelines used to assess the proposals, are well-established and
available. 14 Additionally, when the researchers are the recipients of federal
funding, there is a risk-benefit analysis, a requirement of informed consent,
and protections for vulnerable populations.21 5
It is interesting and ironic, in light of the foregoing analysis that there
are some indications that Congress might opt to ban reproductive cloning
entirely and permanently, but permit therapeutic cloning under some
circumstances. 6 If anything, the established jurisprudence more firmly
213 Indeed, there are important cases recognizing a privacy right or related
fundamental rights in personal autonomy contexts quite distinct from either
abortion or contraception. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(upholding parental autonomy in choosing a mode of education for their children);
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (same); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that the right to interracial marriage is a fundamental right);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (protecting the right of the
family to determine its own living arrangements); and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978) (recognizing the right to marry as a fundamental right).
214 See Henry T. Greely, The Control of Genetic Research: Involving the
"Groups Between," 33 Hous. L. REV. 1397, 1399 (1997).21 Id. at 1401-02.
216 See Wesley J. Smith, Close the Door on Cloning, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Jan.
14, 2002, at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-smith0 11402.
shtml.
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embraces and protects reproductive cloning than it does therapeutic
cloning. The naked clone scenario, which brings the world a new living
baby, should properly be viewed as constitutionally secured, more so than
a laboratory procedure that produces, subjects to experimentation, and then
discards cloned human embryos solely for utilitarian purposes of scien-
tific/medical research. Yet such is the degraded quality of the public debate
on cloning that the United States Senate is seriously considering the exact
opposite approach.217
One final, rather remote, possibility deserves mention. Some people
might want to use cloning to produce viable human embryos or infants, but
with no intention of rearing them. This presumably would be a rare
situation, one that includes certain of the more objectionable scenarios
posited by the opponents of cloning. If someone engages in cloning, and
then sells the embryos to others to gestate or pays others to gestate the
embryos, and the babies are eventually brought up by others, it is likely that
reasons beyond many or all of the usual reasons for having children are
fueling the process." ' There could be a compelling governmental interest
in regulating or banning cloning under these circumstances, owing to the
unconventional motivations at work and the dissevering of embryo
formation, gestation, and rearing. Legal intervention to prevent nefarious
forms of cloning is entirely proper, as it has been when it has also
proscribed the selling of children, infanticide, enslavement of children,
child abuse and neglect, child pornography, and other evils that touch on
reproductive liberties and the rights to have and rear children. It is where
cloning would take place for worthy reasons harmonious with or indis-
tinguishable from those that always have motivated people to have
children-the naked clone situation-that the law should not pose an
obstacle.
The debate concerning the cloning of humans has swirled around
wildly, with far-fetched horror-story monstrosities crowding out sound
science and common sense. The mad dance of the horribles has also
obscured a key factor that truly resides at the heart of the matter, both
literally and figuratively: love. Love is a word that those who would outlaw
cloning with a sweeping ban rarely mention, but it is actually the most
important part of the entire issue. Among all the reasons why people might
want to have children, including children of cloning, love is paramount.
27 Id. The House of Representatives and President Bush, of course, both favor
total bans on the cloning of humans for any purpose whatsoever. See Weiss, Mass.
Firm's Disclosure, supra note 6.
28 See Robertson, supra note 87, at 1398-99.
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Cloning calls to mind the legend of Brigadoon, as immortalized in the
musical play by Alan Jay Lerner and Frederick Loewe. In the play, a
remarkable little village only comes to life and becomes accessible to
outsiders for a single day every one hundred years. After that one day,
Brigadoon and everyone in it vanishes again for another century. A visitor
can only remain in Brigadoon if he or she loves someone within it very
much, because "when ye love some one deeply, anythin' is possible...
Even miracles."2 9 So too, with cloning, there are people for whom the
dream of having children through their own biological processes has been
an impossible dream, mostly out of sight and out of mind for virtually
everyone but those directly affected. Now, with the intervention of modern
science, there is a window about to open that might make the dream come
true for some people. Those who would ban all cloning of human beings
permanently are on the verge of slamming and locking the window and
closing the shutters, blocking out the sunlight and bringing about the end
of the day. If we care enough about these would-be parents and the children
they could nurture, there may yet be a way to prevent their dreams from
disappearing. Cloning, in the real world, would not be a horror story, but
a love story, made possible through the miracle of scientific advancement.
As in Brigadoon, with sufficient love, even miracles are possible.
VII. CONCLUSION
Fear and misunderstanding have spawned extreme, and extremely
vocal, opposition to the cloning of human beings. This opposition has taken
root in the form of several highly restrictive state laws and threatens to
become a federal ban as well. Notably, cloning is properly viewed as one
more form of human reproduction, both different from the others and also
similar.
Modern advances in the science and technology of cloning have
produced some startling headlines and emotional reactions, as successes of
varying degrees have been reported in cloning sheep, mice, and cows. More
than all the other examples, the recent announcement of the first tentative,
limited breakthrough in cloning a human being ignited a firestorm of
denunciations and vows to ban such cloning permanently, under all
circumstances and for all purposes. Two Presidents of the United States,
the Pope, numerous senators and members of Congress of both major
political parties, and hosts of world leaders have spoken with virtually one
voice in decrying the cloning of humans, irrespective of the motives of
those involved and the potential benefits that could be realized. But, as
2 9 FREDRCK LOEWE, BRIGADOON act II, finale (1948).
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Clarence Darrow noted in his immortal closing argument in the Leopold
and Loeb trial, when the people speak with one voice it is often out of
"pure prejudice," and a demand for killing, rather than love and mercy.22°
Darrow was arguing against the death penalty in a case in which it seemed
all the world was united in clamoring for the execution of his two young
defendants. The point he made there is fully applicable in the naked clone
context decades later: Unanimity of public opinion does not equate to
justice. Most often, it is a sign of rampant prejudice.
Much of the intense animosity has been on the level of unfounded fear,
science fiction fantasy, moralistic bias, and slippery slope prognostications.
Opponents of cloning imagine a horror-story world in which mad scientists
and evil geniuses mass-produce hordes of identical warriors, slaves, or
monsters ready to effectuate their malevolent purposes. They see cloning
as the doorway to a world in which human beings are reduced to mere
commodities, their vital organs forcibly harvested from them for profit or
the personal benefit of their master. They predict a world where people
clone themselves and others, in conjunction with genetic engineering, to
create legions of designer offspring, made to specification like, and treated
like products, not people. But this world does not exist and could not exist,
even in the absence of any legislation regulating or banning cloning. These
specters of doom are either scientifically impossible, already illegal, or
both.
A frequently cited attack on cloning is entitled The Wisdom of
Repugnance.22' The unintentional irony of that title perfectly summarizes
the deeply flawed reasoning that usually has been proffered in opposition
to the cloning of humans. Repugnance is endowed with no inherent
wisdom. On the contrary, when we feel an inexplicable, ill-defined loathing
for someone or something, divorced from reason and rationality, that
revulsion is not wisdom, but prejudice. We may concede that people have
a common tendency to hate without reason, and a powerful urge to destroy
that which, through misunderstanding, is hated. Again, this human penchant
to demonize and demolish the unknowns that frighten us is not wisdom to
be celebrated. It is unarticulated, baseless fear and hatred, and we should
seek to overcome it, not to enshrine it.
Cloning is utterly incapable of mass-producing people, as are in vitro
fertilization, artificial insemination, and all the other modem forms of
assisted reproduction. In fact, this Article has noted several ways in which
cloning could be both physically safer and legally less problematic than
some other well-established modes of reproduction. Moreover, the reasons
220 See ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED: CLARENCE DARROW IN HIS OWN WORDS
20, 85-86 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1957).
221 See Kass, supra note 80.
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why individuals might want to use cloning are very consonant with the
reasons people have always chosen to have children, throughout the
world's history. Cloning, like all other types of latter-day assisted
reproduction, is at its core a process that results in the birth of a baby, who,
by virtue of an array of environmental and developmental factors, would
grow up to be a unique individual, a fully human being.
This is reproduction, not replication. Genetics are not everything;
differing environments produce different people, even among identical
twins. When people are cloned, they would be genetically less similar than
identical twins, because they have different mitochondrial DNA. They
would also experience, and be shaped by, quite divergent environmental
influences, beginning within the mother's uterus and extending through all
the formative years in the familial milieu. They each would be distinct and
unique, and entitled to all human rights.
The overwhelming majority of people who would endure the great
expense and effort to have a child through cloning would do so for much
the same reasons people have babies through coital reproduction, in vitro
fertilization, artificial insemination, and surrogacy-and those reasons
have, as their epicenter, love.
This Article has posited the naked clone situation to describe those
instances in which people earnestly desire to have a child and choose, for
their own very personal reasons, to use cloning to realize their dream, and
yet find the legal system standing as a barricade in their path. The anti-
cloning laws single out and ban the cloning choice while other modes of
human reproduction and family building remain legal, respectable,
honorable, and even hallowed. Contemporary jurisprudence accommodates
traditional procreation, adoption, foster parenting, in vitro fertilization, and
the use of various forms of surrogacy. But the anti-cloning laws would,
without justification, leave the naked clone in an unprotected class of one.
We mentioned Clarence Darrow's renowned closing argument in
Leopold and Loeb and its resonance now, decades later, in a very different
context. It is fitting to conclude this Article as Clarence Darrow ended his
ultimately triumphant plea for the lives of his young clients, by quoting
from The Rubiyat of Omar Khayyam:
So I be written in the Book of Love,
I do not care about that Book above;
Erase my name or write it as you will,
So I be written in the Book of Love.
222
222 See supra note 220, at 87. The meaning of the verse is essentially that it is
more important to devote oneself to love here on earth in this lifetime than to be
preoccupied with any heavenly ledger in which the names of people entitled to an
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.We have seen that sweeping anti-cloning laws are inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent recognizing a fundamental right to have children,
as well as the cases acknowledging a constitutional right to privacy and
personal autonomy. Even within the context of therapeutic cloning for
purposes of medical or scientific research, the bans may fail to withstand
judicial scrutiny as an impermissible infringement on First Amendment
rights of free expression and inquiry.
Reproductive cloning clearly implicates fundamental rights--the right
of couples and individuals to bear and beget children, and to be free from
governmental intrusion in matters involving intensely personal decisions
regarding the creation of new life. Cases finding fundamental rights to
marry, educate our children, use contraceptives, and abort, also support the
general right to make our own reproductive choices. Thus, the naked clone
situation implicates fundamental rights-the right of couples and individuals
to bear and beget children, and to be free from governmental intrusion in
matters involving intensely personal decisions regarding the creation of
new life. Encroachment on such rights invokes strict scrutiny by the
judiciary, and the arguments arrayed against cloning fail to constitute the
requisite compelling governmental interest, whether in isolation or in the
aggregate. And certainly, any sweeping, permanent ban is not narrowly
tailored to achieve whatever governmental interest might exist.
A better approach would be to regulate, not to ban. Constitutionally
sound regulation would provide safeguards, require demonstrably adequate
success rates, and healthy offspring in animal tests before allowing full-
scale reproductive human cloning. Powerful incentives already exist-both
financial and emotional--to proceed with caution and prudence. These
incentives are in place, independent of any legislation, because reasonable,
rational people will not spend huge sums of money to subject themselves
and their children to formidable physical risks. If at all, legislation is only
advisable to address those few anomalous cases that might result in
premature and irresponsible cloning initiatives.223
eternal reward are recorded. The verse may be read as implying that the successful
pursuit of the former necessarily leads toward the latter as well.
223 One such example is arguably Clonaid, which self-identifies as "the first
human cloning company." Clonaid was founded in February 1997 by a person
known only as Radl. Rail is the leader of the Raelian Movement, an international
religious organization which claims that life on Earth was created scientifically
through genetic engineering by a human extraterrestrial race named Elohim. The
Raelian Movement also claims that Jesus was resurrected through an advanced
cloning technique the Elohim performed. The movement seeks to use Clonaid to
clone human beings as soon as possible, with a view toward attaining eternal life.
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People have always feared the unknown and resisted the unfamiliar.
During its early years, in vitro fertilization also was the target of bitter
attacks and predictions of disaster. It has now become virtually common-
place, and the world still turns on its axis. Despite all the sensationalist
films and novels, cloning is not an evil force from a hostile planet. It is one
more in a series of new opportunities made possible by the best that science
has to offer: the chance for people to have children of their own, where
before there was no chance, only an impossible dream.
For more information on Clonaid, see Clonaid Homepage, at www.clonaid.com
(last visited June 11, 2002). See also Weiss, First Human Embryos, supra note 5
(mentioning an announcement that Clonaid succeeded in preliminary experiments
on cloning humans).
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